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I. INTRODUCTION
A cap-and-trade program is likely to be a centerpiece of federal
climate-change legislation.1 The presence of a national market does not,
however, render irrelevant the states’ vital interest in the goals and
operation of a national trading program. An effective climate-change
trading program is likely to have profound impacts on our industrial
economy and, as a consequence, will present complex political,
economic, and environmental issues that are of as much interest at the
state as the federal level.2 The issue of who—federal or state actors—
should control key parameters within a cap-and-trade program is
contested in current debates about federal climate-change legislation.3
1. A recent federal legis lative proposal calls for a cap-and-trade p rogram
t o control stationary source and transportation emissions. See generally American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 301-360, available at
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/text. That bill narrowly passed the House
in June 2009. Carolyn Lochhead, Landmark Climate Bill Squeaks Through, S.F. CHRON .,
June 27, 2009, at A1. Similar legislation is under consideration in the Senate. See Dina
Cappiello, EPA to Crack Down on Greenhouse Gas Emitters, S.F. CHRON ., Oct. 1, 2009,
A1. President Obama is likely to support such cap-and-trade legislation. See John M .
Broder, Setting “Green” Goals, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1.
2. See generally Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies,
47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445 (2007). Recognizing the complexity added by political
debates, Professor Heinmiller argues that the “politics of cap-and-trade policies are a
reality that needs to be recognized and understood rather than lamented by social
scientists.” Id. at 449. See also id. at 464 (observing that “the trading of resource rights
is not simply a market transaction but a socio-economic reshaping of resource dependent
industries and communities”).
3. See the Introduction in Victor Flatt’s article in this issue of the San Diego
Journal of Climate & Energy Law; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE ,
CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAP ER: AP P ROP RIATE ROLES FOR
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (2008) [hereinafter WHITE PAP ER], available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/PDF/selected_legislation/w
hite%20paper%20st-lcl%20roles%20final%202-22.pdf. An early draft of cap-and-trade
legislation for the electricity sector preempted state regulation of the sector. See J.R.
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Should federal law preempt state control over a trading system, so that
only the federal government makes key determinations? Or should
federal law allow states to exert at least some control within a federal
program?
If a federal cap-and-trade program preempts states’ roles in a trading
system, that preemption could have a substantial impact on the states’
ability to address climate change.4 To be sure, federal legislation is likely to
leave considerable scope for state control in areas like land use.5 Federal
legislation might also provide states with indirect control over emissions
from electricity-generating sources if federal legislation allows states to
continue to implement a variety of energy policies, including renewable
portfolio standards, energy efficiency programs, and other demandreduction initiatives.6 But direct control over stationary-source emissions in
both the electricity and industrial sectors is likely to remain an important
lever in achieving greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals.7 If federal
legislation imposing a cap-and-trade program on direct stationary-source
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate
Change, 155 U. PA . L. REV. 1499, 1536 n.135 (2007). Legislation under consideration at
the time of this writing provides a relatively wide scope for state control, as discussed
further below. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. See generally American Clean
Energy and Security Act §§ 301-360.
4. See Part II(B) of William W. Buzbee’s article in this issue of the San Diego
Journal of Climate & Energy Law.
5. WHITE PAP ER, supra note 3, at 2, 7; American Clean Energy and Security Act
§ 222 (amending Title VIII of the Clean Air Act to require regional metropolitan
planning organizations to develop greenhouse gas reduction targets and implementation
strategies).
6. Renewable portfolio standards, which promote alternative energy, and demandreduction measures, which promote conservation and energy efficiency, reduce the need
for carbon-based electricity and thereby provide an indirect mechanism for reducing
emissions from electricity-generating units. M any states are, or could, pursue these
strategies. See, e.g., FRANZ T. LITZ, T OWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON FEDERAL
AND STATE ROLES IN U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE P OLICY 8, 14-15 (Pew Center on Global
Climate Change 2008), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf; Thomas
A. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in
the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26
VA . ENVTL . L.J. 227, 239 (2008) (observing that energy efficiency, conservation, and
renew able energy are key areas for state action). T he federal legis lat ion under
consideration at the time of this writing creates a federal renewable energy requirement
but does not preempt a state’s ability to establish a more stringent requirement than the
federal standard. American Clean Energy and Security Act § 101 (amending Title VI of
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978). Although the federal legislation
provides for an increased federal role by requiring states to adopt more stringent building
codes, actual control will remain at the state level, and states retain the power to be more
stringent than the federal minimum. American Clean Energy and Security Act § 201
(amending Energy Conservation and Production Act § 304(c)).
7. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in 2007, 34% of U.S.
GHG emissions came from electricity generation and 20% came from industrial sources.
EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2007 ES-14
(2009).
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emissions preempts state control over the covered sources, that preemption
would significantly impact the scope of state climate policies and their
capacity to regulate the facilities within their jurisdictions.
At the same time, state initiatives could have national consequences in
light of the interconnections created by a national trading market, the
lack of uniformity generated by divergent state approaches, and the
duplicative administrative resources devoted to regulatory programs at
both the federal and state levels. Determining the appropriate balance
between the potential benefits and detrimental impacts of allowing state
control poses a significant challenge.
This Article addresses a critical question about a state’s role in the
operation of a national cap-and-trade program: whether federal legislation
should allow states to be more stringent than the federal government.8
Numerous scholars have articulated compelling justifications for
allowing states to be more stringent than the federal government.9 This
Article takes the next step: it not only reviews these justifications but
also assesses particular mechanisms for achieving state stringency and
evaluates their potential negative consequences in order to provide a
more nuanced assessment of the wisdom of state stringency. I argue that
allowing states to achieve greater stringency is justified notwithstanding
certain negative consequences, particularly since the states are unlikely
to impose more stringent targets (and risk negative consequences) unless
the federal program is inadequate. In addition, the analysis of differing
8. Certain complications could arise in determining stringency. Here, I refer only
to the absolute number of allowances required. A key issue, however, is the extent to
which the trading system permits the use of not only allowances representing emissions
within the covered sectors but also the use of offsets that come from abroad or for
domestic sources that are not covered by the trading system. An unanswered question is
whether a state program that imposed a more lenient annual cap, but limited offset use, is
more or less stringent than a federal cap that allows extensive use of offsets.
9. See generally William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and
Preemption, 3 ENVTL . & ENERGY L & POL ’Y J. 261 (2008); WILLIAM ANDREEN ET AL .,
COOP ERATIVE FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE : WHY FEDERAL , STATE , AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS M UST CONTINUE TO PARTNER (Center for Progressive Reform 2008),
available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/federalismClimateChange.pdf;
Buz bee, supra note 4, at Part II(B); Robert L. G licksman & Richard E. Levy , A
Collectiv e Action Per spective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Envir onmental
Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW . U.L. REV. 579, 604 (2008);
Flatt, supra note 3, at Part VI; Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global
Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); cf.
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (arguing that federal legislation should
generally allow states to be more, but not less, stringent than federal standards).
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mechanisms’ varying impacts should assist decision-makers considering
alternative policy designs.
This Article is the first in a series that will address the wisdom
of allowing state control within a federal trading system. Subsequent
scholarship will address trading policies more generally, including the
extent to which federal legislation should allow states to impose direct
facility regulations, differing offset requirements, or trading restrictions
to achieve potential economic and environmental co-benefits.10 Subsequent
scholarship will also address allowance distribution11 —namely, whether
the federal government or the states should control the distribution of
federal allowances, an issue with substantial political and economic
implications.
Part II of this Article articulates the primary justifications for allowing
states to set more stringent caps. The first is the national importance of
creating a safety net in the not-unlikely event of current or future federal
failure. The second is grounded in democratic theory: the states’
democratic prerogative to address climate-change and control emissions
from in-state sources.
Part III turns to practical mechanisms to achieve state stringency. It
first observes that, in a national trading program, states cannot achieve
stringency without the capacity to retire the allowances associated with
their additional reductions. Since one cannot identify the strengths and
weaknesses of letting states set caps and retire allowances without
evaluating the practical consequences of different forms of achieving
stringency, Part III describes the range of mechanisms through which
states could both reduce emissions and retire the associated allowances.
The mechanisms states could use to achieve stringency will depend upon
the powers granted the states by federal legislation. Part III therefore
describes a set of possible decentralization options and the mechanisms
that states could use to achieve stringency within each model.
Part IV articulates the potential adverse impacts that could result from
states using these mechanisms to achieve more stringent goals. It
considers potential impacts on the national allowance market, negative
impacts on out-of-state consumers, uniformity, and administrative
efficiency considerations.

10. Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? The Question of State Trading
Controls within a Federal Cap-and-Trade Program, 28 VA . ENVTL . L.J. (forthcoming
2010).
11. In a federal cap-and-trade program, the federal government would set a yearly
cap on emissions from the sectors covered by the program. The government would then
allocate the allowances associated with the cap, with each allowance representing a right
to emit a certain quantity of GHGs.
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Part V concludes that, on balance, state stringency is justified. The
benefits of creating a safety net and the democratic goals served by
allowing state stringency are highly compelling. And while the adverse
impacts present cause for concern, they are relatively unlikely to occur
given the extensive collective action impediments to states establishing
more stringent objectives. States are likely to set more stringent targets
only when the federal goal is blatantly inadequate, precisely the scenario
in which state action is most justified. Considering the potential adverse
impacts on the merits, Part V concludes that potential external impacts
on the national allowance market are the most serious prospective
consequence and an important factor in developing options for achieving
stringency. Nonetheless, some impact on the national allowance market
is acceptable in light of the significant benefits of state action. Potential
impacts on out-of-state consumers, uniformity, and administrative
efficiency are long-accepted costs of a federal system that respects the
inherent value of state sovereignty, and therefore present less cause for
concern.
Part VI briefly articulates some of the implications of the foregoing
analysis for federal legislation. While it does not recommend either a
particular mechanism for achieving stringency or a particular decentralization
model, it makes clear that federal legislation must explicitly delineate
the contours of state power in order to enable states to exercise
autonomy free from the threat of legal challenges.
Before turning to the Article’s primary arguments, I first articulate
several preliminary assumptions. This Article does not contemplate a
purely decentralized approach that would rely solely upon state or
regional action. While many states have initiated state and regional
efforts to combat climate change, those efforts cannot substitute for a
federal program.12 The Article assumes a federal cap-and-trade program
with trading in federal allowances.
The Article addresses only a potential “downstream” cap-and-trade
program focused on stationary sources—a program that would impose
allowance requirements on the actual emitters of GHGs. It does not
address an “upstream” program that would impose requirements on
entities like oil producers, mining companies, the transportation sector,
12. See Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local
Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL ’Y REV. 119, 135-36 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A
Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State
Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 794-97 (2008).
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or other entities that are upstream from, and do not directly cause,
emissions.13
The Article also focuses on the wisdom of designing federal legislation to
incorporate state control, not judicial standards for determining whether
and to what degree federal legislation, once designed, preempts state
action.14
II. THE BENEFITS OF ALLOWING STATES TO SET
MORE STRINGENT CAPS
A. The Nature and Significance of the Caps
A trading program’s stringency is fundamental to achieving
environmental goals and to the overall effectiveness of a trading
program.15 Climate policies typically embody two types of caps, both of
which play a crucial role. The first type of cap is characterized by
overarching long-term, economy-wide goals. Such goals are often
established as a percentage reduction from a given baseline year by a
certain date, like 20% below 2005 levels by 2020.16 The economy-wide
goals in recent legislative proposals reflect the share of global reductions
that the jurisdiction is politically willing to accept, a judgment rooted in
a complex web of environmental and economic considerations.
Implementing a GHG trading program requires a second step:
translating the general goals into yearly emissions allocations for the

13. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL . L. REV. 293 (2008) (proposing upstream cap-andtrade program); David M . Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input
Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 65 (2009). Nor does the Article address the potential
interrelationship between upstream and downstream controls, whether imposed at the federal
or state levels. While upstream controls may ultimately present a useful complement or
alternative to downstream requirements, such controls, and the relative role of the federal
government and the states in imposing them, raise issues that are beyond the scope of
this Article.
14. F or analy s es of how t he court s s hould evaluat e a fut ure conflict
bet w een federal climate-change law and state initiatives, see, for example, Buzbee,
supra note 4; Dan Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ.
L. REV. 879 (2008); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9; Alexandra B. Klass, State
Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY . L.A. L.
REV. 1653 (2008); cf. James R. M ay, Of Happy Incidents, Climate, Federalism, and
Preemption, 17 T EMP . POL . & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465 (2008) (addressing preemption of
state law under the existing Clean Air Act).
15. See generally Lesley K. M cAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-AndTrade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL . L. 395 (2009).
16. For example, the Waxman-M arkey legislation establishes the goal of reducing
emissions by 20% below 2005 levels by 2020 and by 83% by 2050, with a number of
interim goals. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311
(2009) (establishing Title VII, section 702).
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covered sectors.17 By specifying the number of allowances to be
distributed to facilities in the program each year, the yearly emissions
allocations function as a kind of cap for the covered sectors.18 These
yearly “caps” determine the proportion of the overall emissions
reduction goal to be achieved (or at least financed) by the covered
facilities rather than by sources that are not covered by the cap-and-trade
program.19 The yearly caps are critical to the achievement of actual
emissions reductions in any given year. If the yearly cap is higher than
actual existing emissions from covered facilities, so that facilities receive
more allowances than they need, then the facilities are unlikely to reduce
emissions. Even if the cap is below existing emissions, its stringency is
critical to whether facilities will be motivated to make reasonably
achievable reductions.20
The yearly allowance allocations also dictate the pace at which the
overarching economy-wide goals will be reached. Policymakers could
require the same percentage reduction in allowance allocations each
17. See, e.g., id. (establishing Title VII, section 721, which dictates the number of
allowances to be issued each year of the cap-and-trade program). Prior trading programs
for traditional pollutants have generally had only one cap: the emissions-reduction goals
for the regulated sectors have translated directly into the annual caps for those sectors.
For example, in the Acid Rain Program, the caps for the program’s two phases were
simply based upon achieving a certain level of reduction from the facilities covered in
each phase of the program. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 399-400.
18. The yearly allocation numbers constitute only a “quasi-cap.” If the trading
program permits the use of offsets, then the yearly allowance allocation does not function as a
true cap. A covered entity that purchased offsets from reductions (or sequestration)
outside of the covered sector would be able to use offsets, not just the initially allocated
allowances, to cover its emissions. Although properly implemented offsets could generate
real reductions, they allow emissions within the covered sector to exceed the yearly allowance
allocation.
19. A s s ume, for example, that a program s ought to reduce all emis sions t o
1 million tons per year by 2015. Assume further that the sectors covered by the cap-andt rade p rogram constituted 80% of t he nation’s emissions, w hile 20% came from
“uncovered” sources like small facilities and agricultural practices. If the jurisdiction
wanted to concentrate reductions in the covered sectors, it could limit the number of
emission allowances for the covered sectors to 750,000, effectively requiring greater reductions
from the covered sectors. The fact that the covered sectors would be responsible for
reducing emissions to 750,000 tons does not, however, necessarily mean that all the
reductions would, in fact, occur within the covered sectors. While only 750,000 allowances
would be distributed, if facilities in the covered sectors are permitted to purchase offsets,
they could purchase reductions from outside the covered sectors to legitimate additional
emissions. See supra note 18 (discussing impact of offsets on yearly allowance allocations to
covered sectors).
20. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 401-03 (describing failure to achieve feasible
reductions in the Acid Rain Program due to an insufficiently stringent cap).
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year, intensify required reductions as the long-term goals approach, or
concentrate reductions in the early years of the program. The pace of
reductions established by the yearly caps is environmentally significant
because earlier reductions have greater climate-change benefits given the
longevity of GHG emissions in the atmosphere.21
Economy-wide goals and annual allowance allocations are economically
as well as environmentally significant. The pace of reductions and the
relationship of a yearly cap to that year’s actual emissions could
significantly affect the short- and long-term costs of coping with climate
change.22 The potential economic impact of climate-change policies has
been a significant issue in recent policy debates.23 Further, the timing of
the reductions also has economic implications given the long-term
investments associated with energy infrastructure.24 Thus, both the
stringency of the long-term goals and the pace at which they are attained
present critical environmental and economic issues.
B. State Stringency as a Safety Net
As many scholars have noted, a fundamental justification for allowing
overlapping jurisdiction—for allowing states as well as the federal
government to set emission reduction targets—is that the states can
function as a safety net if the federal program proves inadequate.25 If
21. See Richard J . Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Clim ate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1164-68
(2009). The IPCC, in its most recent report, emphasized the importance of near-term reductions
and noted that “[d]elayed emission reductions significantly constrain the opportunities to
achieve lower stabilization levels and increase the risk of more severe climate-change
impacts.” INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE , CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REP ORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 20 (2007).
22. See, e.g., M CKINSEY & COMP ANY , PATHWAYS TO A LOW -CARBON ECONOMY :
VERSION 2 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST CURVE (2009), http://
www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pathways_low_carbon_economy.asp (discussing costs
of climate-change policies); NICHOLAS STERN , STERN REVIEW : T HE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
C H A N G E (2007), http://ww w.hm-treas ury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm (discussing
economics of climate policy).
23. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Emissions Cap Support Wave[r]s among Key
Democrats, S.F. CHRON ., M ay 14, 2009, at A6 (describing legislative concerns about
economic impacts of proposed federal climate legislation).
24. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE , CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REP ORT, SU M M A R Y F O R P OL IC YM A K E R S 19 (2007), av ailable at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. See also M CKINSEY
& COMP ANY , supra note 22, at 12-14 (discussing the importance of significant near-term
reductions and the environmental and economic risks of delay).
25. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 298 (arguing that state programs should not be
preempted because “a more plural regulatory system . . . can help mitigate the damage
caused by possible regulatory and administrative failure at the federal level”); Buzbee,
supra note 4, at Part IV; LITZ, supra note 6, at 11; Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161, 178-81
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states are prevented from setting more stringent long-term goals and
annual caps, then the entire nation is at the mercy of the federal
government’s potentially misguided judgment. The risk is not remote.
Several existing trading programs have set insufficiently stringent targets
that have, in turn, led to over-allocated allowances.26 In some instances,
the over-allocation resulted in failure; allowances exceeded emissions,
creating little, if any, incentive for emissions reductions.27 In other
instances, like the U.S. Acid Rain Program, emissions were reduced to
some extent but not to the extent readily feasible.28
Regulatory redundancy is particularly important where government
entities operate under uncertainty because uncertainty increases the risk
of erroneous decisions.29 Even if federal targets appear sufficient at the
outset, they could prove deficient over time as new information about
the risks of climate change or opportunities for low-cost emission
(2006); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES (NACAA), DEFINING THE ROLE OF
STATES AND LOCALITIES IN FEDERAL GLOBAL WARMING LEGISLATION 11 (June 2008),
http://www.4cleanair.org/documents/NACAAGWConfProceedingsFINAL060608.pdf.
See generally Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1590-91, 1594-95 (discussing general importance
of allowing overlapping state and federal control to provide a state law backup in the
event of federal agency capture). As Professor Kirsten Engel has expressed, the states’
ability to react to an ineffective federal program is critical; “[p]reemption . . . prevents
the political process from policing itself.” Engel, supra, at 163.
26. See M cAllister, supra note 15.
27. Allowances exceeded likely “business as usual” (BAU) emissions during the
first phase of the European Union’s European Trading System (ETS). Id. at 411-12; see
LARRY PARKER, CONG . RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE : T HE EU EMISSIONS T RADING
SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY FOR KYOTO 6 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/92960.pdf. Estimates differ, however, on what emissions “would
have been.” Another analysis concludes that emissions in the EU were lower than they
otherwise would have been. A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW , T HE EUROP EAN
UNION ’S EMISSIONS T RADING SYSTEM IN PERSP ECTIVE 34-35 (2008), available at http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf. In the RECLAIM
program, a southern California effort to improve air quality, allowances exceeded likely
BAU emissions in the program’s early years, dampening emission reduction incentives.
M cAllister, supra note 15, at 412-13, 419-21. The allowances issued in a Chicago air
pollution control program consistently exceeded BAU emissions. Id. at 407-08, 411, 419.
28. Although the Acid Rain Program has led to significant emissions reductions,
the program likely failed to achieve reductions that were technologically and economically
feasible, particularly in its first phase. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 438-39.
29. P rofes sors Engel and A delman observe that environment al regulat ion
is developed under conditions of uncertainty and that even well-intentioned legislation or
regulation routinely fails in light of new developments. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H.
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 92 M INN . L. REV. 1796, 1799-1800 (2008); See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part
I(C); see also Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1619 (arguing that it is particularly important to
allow for state experimentation in new regulatory areas).
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reductions become available.30 Moreover, regulatory programs, once
created, risk stagnation as Congress and implementing agencies become
invested in the status quo.31 Should existing caps prove insufficient,
states may be more nimble at adjusting their caps than the federal
government.32
If states retain the power to respond to federal inadequacy they could
not only directly make-up for the federal failure but also catalyze
improved federal legislation.33 As states respond to a federal lapse with
their own successful initiatives, federal lawmakers could seek to emulate
state successes at the federal level. Moreover, impacted industries in the
more stringent states are likely to lobby for national action that would
require all states to achieve the same goals, equalizing the playing field.
There is a significant risk that federal climate policy will fail to set
emission reduction goals that constitute the United States’ necessary
contribution to the global effort to avert catastrophic climate change.34
The political pressures for weak federal economy-wide goals are
strong.35 While many industries have supported climate-change regulation

30. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(B); M cAllister, supra note 15, at 435-39.
31. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1494-95; 1608-09 (discussing risk of regulatory
stagnation in general); Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part IV (discussing risk of stagnation in
federal climate program).
32. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 441 (observing that Congress was unable to
mobilize to adjust the congressionally set cap for the Acid Rain Program notwithstanding
evidence that a more stringent cap would be environmentally beneficial and economically
justified); LITZ, supra note 6, at 11 (describing New York’s adoption of a more stringent
program in response to the inadequacies of the federal Acid Rain Program).
33. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part IV; Engel, supra note 25, at 170-73.
34. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A) (stating that the greatest risk of federal
failure is that federal law will “set[] the cap too high”). Although not without dispute, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has suggested that, to reduce atmospheric
carbon concentrations to 450 ppm, developed countries must reduce their emissions by
25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and by 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050. See
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: M ITIGATION . CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO
THE F OURTH A SSESSMENT REP ORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL P ANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 776 (Bert M etz et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). James Hansen, a wellknown atmospheric scientist, has concluded that a sustainable level of carbon concentrations
is 350 ppm, not 450 ppm, a goal that would necessitate even more radical emissions cuts.
See James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim? 2
ATMOS. SCI. J. 217, 228 (2008) available at http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/Target
CO2_20080407.pdf.
35. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A); cf. Cap-and-Trade Charade: The
Political and Business Self-Interest Behind Carbon Limits, WALL ST. J., M ar. 3, 2007, at
A8 (observing the intensely political nature of cap-setting and industries’ interest in how
cap levels will be set). One scholar notes that political compromise often leads to caps
that freeze rather than reduce use; environmentalists are satisfied by the freeze, and
regulated entities are willing to accept the status quo. See Heinmiller, supra note 2, at
454. While the fear of climate change is unlikely to lead to a mere freeze in emissions,
the political dynamic is instructive.
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and recognize both its necessity and its inevitability,36 the powerful
fossil fuel industry—including coal, oil, and gas—is likely to perceive a
climate regime as a significant threat.37 The existing infrastructure serves
the fossil-fuel industry, and a large workforce relies upon it.38 The
fossil-fuel industry is concentrated, politically organized, and powerful,
in contrast to more diffuse and less financially influential environmental
groups, the just emerging-alternative technology sector, and the future
generations who will be most impacted by climate change.39 In addition,
public utilities are likely to be concerned about the costs and implementation
of strict mandates because some existing utility regulations and rate
structures create impediments or disincentives to investing in the
measures necessary to achieve stringent targets—namely, alternative
energy and energy efficiency.40
Fundamentally, it is difficult for members of Congress or anyone else
to ignore the short-term pain that a transition from carbon will likely
cause, particularly when both the environmental benefits of avoiding
climate change and the economic benefits of new green technologies are
remote abstractions that have yet to be realized.41 Moreover, since
climate-change harms will be unevenly distributed and are likely to be
most serious outside the United States, many legislators and their

36. M any industries have joined the Climate Action Partnership, a collaborative
industry and nongovernmental organizational effort to advocate for federal climatechange legislation. See United States Climate Action Partnership M embers (2009),
http://www.us-cap.org/about/members/index.asp.
37. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 214 (2005).
38. Terry Dinan, Economic and Budget Issue Brief Trade-Offs in Allocating
Allowances for CO2 Emissions, 2007 Congressional Budget Office 3, http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8946/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf.
39. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 1168 (describing power of entrenched interests);
id. at 1180-83 (describing why it is more difficult for environmentalists to be politically
powerful).
40. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity
Markets, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497 (2005) (describing how electricity regulation
fails to encourage environmentally sound electricity generation).
41. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A); Farber, supra note 14, at 920-21
(observing that regulation is likely to be “too timid” because it does not adequately
represent the interests of the future generations likely to suffer the most); Lazarus, supra
note 21, at 1172 (describing the innate human difficulty in taking action with short-term
impacts in order to provide long-term benefits); id. at 1179-80 (describing how short
elect ion cycles lead policymakers t o focus on s hort-term rat her t han long-t erm
consequences).
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constituents may not perceive the requisite urgency for legislation.42 On
a practical level, the future prospects of carbon-capture-and-storage
technology could lead Congress to delay significant near-term reduction
requirements in the hope that the technology will obviate the need to
transition away from coal.43 The federal government may, therefore, fail
to set stringent economy-wide, percentage-reduction goals.
Recently proposed federal legislation provides a case in point. The
Waxman-Markey bill establishes an economy-wide goal of reducing
emissions by 20% below 2005 emissions by 2020. 44 In House
negotiations, however, the bill reduced the percentage of the reduction
that must come from the sectors covered by the bill’s proposed trading
program to 17% below 2005 emissions by 2020.45 Both goals fall far
short of the minimum reductions needed by developed countries to avoid
substantial climate risks. Based on scientific assessments of potential
mitigation scenarios, the IPCC concluded that developed countries
would have to reduce emissions by 25%-40% below 1990 levels by
2020 to achieve sustainable atmospheric concentrations of 450 ppm of
carbon dioxide.46 Since the IPCC used a lower 1990 baseline, not the
2005 baseline employed by the Waxman-Markey bill, the IPCC calls for
a much more substantial reduction. Scientists have recently suggested
that the 450 ppm goal is not sustainable, and that even deeper reductions
are necessary to achieve a more sustainable 350 ppm concentration of
atmospheric carbon dioxide.47 Determining the appropriate target is
likely to be a politically complex undertaking and this Article is not
intended to stipulate the “correct” answer.48 The comparison between
the Waxman-Markey bill and the IPCC’s projections nonetheless reveals
the risk that federal legislation could prove insufficient.

42. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 1170.
43. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-term Storage of Carbon Dioxide,
58 EMORY L.J. 103, 115-23 (2008) (describing carbon capture and storage); DAVID J.
HAYES & JOEL C. BEAUVAIS, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 691, 707-15
(M ichael B. Gerrard, ed. 2007).
44. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311
(2009) (establishing Title VII, section 702).
45. Id. (establishing Title VII, section 703).
46. I N TE R G O VER NM EN TAL P A NEL O N C LI M ATE C H A N G E , C O N TR I B U TI O N O F
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REP ORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE , CLIMATE CHANGE 776 (Bert M etz et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2007), available at, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4wg3-chapter13.pdf.
47. See Hansen et al., supra note 34, at 1.
48. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 396; David Driesen, Capping Carbon 15
(unp ublished manus cript on file w it h aut hor) (discussing how caps should be set),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1463016.
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Even if the federal government is willing to establish lofty economywide goals that appear to lead the nation to significant reductions in the
long term, it may establish short-term annual caps that result in overallocated allowances.49 Past trading programs have over-allocated
allowances, particularly as a program begins, to build industry comfort
with and support for trading programs.50 Annual caps could also be
premised upon projected economic growth that fails to materialize.51 If
growth and associated industrial activity is less than expected, then more
allowances will be released than are appropriate for the level of
economic activity, resulting in fewer emissions reductions.52 Another
risk, borne out in the European Union, is that the annual caps will be
based upon inaccurate modeling that overestimates existing emissions.53
While the United States could learn from European missteps, success is
not assured, particularly given the political pressures that are likely to
attach to setting annual allowance allocations.54
Of course, similar political forces and economic concerns could keep
states from setting sufficiently stringent caps. But the concentrated
power of industries opposed to vigorous climate-change legislation is

49. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1551-52 (observing that “[e]ven if the ultimate
endpoint cap is sound, the interim steps to get there can be too slow and lax” and that
“those most directly affected will surely lobby to put off the day when production and
behavioral changes, and attendant expenses, will have to be confronted . . . “).
50. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 414 (describing general issue of overallocation to
obtain political support); id. at 433 (noting how Illinois designed its allowance allocation
rules to “make businesses feel comfortable”); id. at 434 (describing how RECLAIM ’s
allowance allocation process included concessions designed to make it “politically
salable”).
51. Policymakers are loathe to take actions that could ultimately constrain growth,
and are, hence, likely to err on the side of overestimating rather than underestimating
projected emissions.
52. In other trading programs, inaccurate (and optimistic) projections of economic
growth have led to emissions projections that exceed actual emissions. See M cAlllister,
supra note 15, at 412-13, 433 (describing desire to allow for economic growth as one
reason for overallocation in the RECLAIM program); LARRY PARKER, CRS REP ORT FOR
CONGRESS, CLIMATE CHANGE : T HE EU EMISSIONS T RADING SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY
F O R K Y O TO 12-13 (2007) (describing s tate desire t o allow for economic grow t h
as one fact or in s tates ’ s etting ins ufficiently s tringent caps), http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/92960.pdf.
53. A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW , T HE EUROP EAN UNION ’S EMISSIONS
T RADING SYSTEM IN PERSP ECTIVE 32 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2008),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf; PARKER, supra
note 52, at 5-6.
54. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 396 (describing reasons why allowances may
be overallocated).
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unlikely to be as potent in each state as it is in the federal government.55
The surge in state climate activity to date suggests that at least some
states will act if the federal government fails to do so.56 That state
potential could be significant not only in the face of federal inaction but
also in the face of insufficient federal action. Moreover, the issue is not
whether states will act but whether federal law should prevent them from
doing so. Skepticism about the states’ willingness to act does not justify
preempting their capacity to do so.
C. Democratic Justifications for State Stringency
The risk of federal failure is not the only justification for allowing
states to set more stringent caps than the federal government. The
determination of where to set long-term reduction goals and annual caps
requires critical political judgments.57 The states as well as the federal
government seek the opportunity to express the political views of their
citizens about the appropriate level of emissions reductions to be
achieved.58
Some have argued that state citizens’ political will is less central in the
context of climate change than in the context of traditional pollutants
due to the global, rather than local, consequences of GHG emissions.59
55. For example, coal industry opposition to climate legislation is likely to be less
intense in states that do not rely upon coal mining or inexpensive coal power. One
potential explanation for California’s relatively aggressive climate-change policy is that
the state does not depend heavily upon coal-fired power.
56. See generally PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE , U.S. STATES AND
REGIONS, http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (describing
state climate-change programs).
57. See Heinmiller, supra note 2, at 452-53 (describing the political tensions
between environmentalists and resource users that arise in cap-setting debates); id. at 455
(noting that setting caps is not “simply a technical exercise” but “the subject of intense
political struggle and negotiation by opposing interests”).
58. See ANDREEN ET AL ., supra note 9, at 8 (describing state and local desire to
exceed federal minimums to meet constituent demands); id. at 284, 294 (observing that
states might want to set more stringent caps or deadlines than a federal cap-and-trade
program); NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF
STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 12-13 (observing that many state agency
officials fear that a national program will be insufficiently stringent and that states will
seek flexibility in reduction goals and mechanisms for achieving them); see generally,
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 M ICH . L. REV. 570, 609-610
(1996); see Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977)
(describing democratic justification for allowing state environmental decision-making).
59. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 288 (describing argument); WHITE PAP ER, supra
note 3, at 11-12 (stating that “[o]ne key distinction between climate change and most
other environmental problems is that climate change is a global, not local, problem,
perhaps providing less need for allowing States to be more stringent”). This argument is
consistent with the “matching principle,” the principle that the scale of the regulating
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According to this argument, existing pollution control laws, like the
Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act, employ a cooperative
federalist model that allows states to continue to exercise control because
those statutes, unlike climate-change legislation, address pollution that has
local consequences. Although federal law was necessary due to a
variety of collective action failures,60 the local pollution consequences
justified giving states continued, overlapping power to control facility
emissions, particularly under the CAA.61 And even though federal
environmental legislation was partly motivated by the transboundary
nature of many environmental harms—a parallel concern in the climatechange context—that transboundary harm was not exclusive of but,
rather, in addition to local impacts. According to this argument, the
absence of local GHG impacts renders state democratic control
unnecessary.
The argument that local or state control is unnecessary because
climate change is a global problem oversimplifies the issue. State views
on the appropriate level of stringency could differ significantly from
federal judgments. States’ more stringent commitments could, in some
cases, be premised on a general concern about the global consequences
of climate change.62 In other states, the potential local consequences of
jurisdiction should match the scale of the environmental problem. See Henry N. Butler &
Jonathan R. M acey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating
Federal Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL ’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).
60. See Robert V. P ercival, Environmental Feder alis m : H is tor ical Roots
and Contemporary Models, 54 M D . L. REV. 1141 (1995) (describing why states failed to
enact sufficient environmental protection laws, prompting federal action).
61. For example, the federal Clean Air Act gives states a central role in making the
hard choices about how to achieve federal air quality standards. The federal government
does establish minimum technology-based standards for all new sources and for existing
sources in nonattainment areas. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2009) (new source
performance standards); id. § 7503(a)(2) (establishing requirement that new sources in
nonattainment areas achieve the lowest achievable emission rate); id. § 7502(c)(a)
(requiring states to implement reasonably available control technology requirement for
existing sources in nonattainment areas). But the states must develop state implementation
plans that describe how the state will attain National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Id.
§ 7410(a)(1). Although the federal government sets minimum technology-based requirements
for facilities under the federal Clean Water Act, the Act’s requirement that states impose
controls to meet their water quality standards is likely to give states an increasing role in
determining facility permitting requirements. Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1313(d)
(2009) (establishing TM DL process).
62. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 129-30 (describing the desire for a
“warm glow” as one explanation for state and local climate-change initiatives that
otherwise appear irrational). States could also seek to attract residents and businesses by
creating a reputation as an environmentally responsible state. See Barry G. Rabe et al.,
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climate change could prompt an urgency that is not shared in other parts
of the country, where the predicted impacts are less drastic or more
uncertain.63 For example, rising sea levels will significantly impact
coastal states.64 In some parts of the country, increasing temperatures
will cause dangerous heat waves,65 reduce water supplies,66 and worsen
local air pollution.67 Changing weather patterns could impact agriculture
dramatically.68 To be sure, local actions cannot control these impacts; a
state’s stringency is unlikely, standing alone, to reduce global emissions
enough to protect the more stringent state.69 But the differential impacts
within the United States could nonetheless create differing political
commitments to addressing climate change. Democratic principles
suggest that citizens should retain the ability to express their stronger
commitments through more stringent caps.
The relative costs and benefits of setting stringent caps also vary by
state and could influence the level of stringency that a state finds
acceptable. While climate change may have global causes, climatechange solutions have local consequences that vary significantly around
the country. In some states, GHG reduction policies could provide
worthwhile economic benefits.70 For example, increasing energy efficiency

State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
20-21 (2005).
63. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 289-92 (describing local impacts of climate
change that give “[m]any states … unique, local reasons to be more protective than the
federal government”); NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE
ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 11; Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 2326 (describing how the perceived risk from climate change has prompted some states to
act); see generally UNITED STATES GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE IMP ACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://downloads.
globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impact s -rep ort .p df (describing varying
consequences of climate change around the nation).
64. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 290-92; U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 149-52.
65. U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 89-91.
66. Id. at 41-52.
67. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 289-90; U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 92-94.
68. U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 71-78.
69. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 120. A state could, however, set more
stringent limits in the hope that other states and/or the federal government will follow.
See id. at 129; Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 23.
70. California predicts that implementing its climate change law will produce net
economic benefits. See generally CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD , CLIMATE CHANGE
SCOP ING PLAN : A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE ES-10 to ES-11; 73-79 (2008) [hereinafter
SC O P I N G P LA N ], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted
_scoping_plan.pdf; cf. ANDREEN ET AL ., supra note 9, at 8-9 (noting state interest in more
stringent environmental laws to attract green business); NACAA, Preserving the Rights
of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 11.
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could lower consumer energy costs71 and reduce reliance on uncertain
out-of-state or foreign energy supplies.72 States could also find that
stringent targets enhance incentives to develop green technology in both
the energy efficiency and the alternative energy sectors, providing new
economic and job opportunities for the state.73 To the extent that more
stringent reduction goals lead to greater in-state emission reductions,
climate-change goals could provide an indirect mechanism for reducing
associated co-pollutants and improving air quality,74 an important
objective in states suffering from persistent air pollution.
Moreover, the potential costs of regulating GHG emissions could vary
by state. States that do not rely on carbon-intensive energy sources, like
coal, or that do not rely upon energy-intensive industries are likely to
weather the transition away from fossil fuels more easily and could be
more willing to adopt more stringent reduction goals. For example,
California’s leadership in adopting comprehensive climate-change legislation
could have resulted not only from its general political leanings but also
from the promising economic benefits (through green technology
development) and relatively low costs (due to the state’s relatively minor
reliance on coal) of action. Different cost/benefit balances could thus
impact states’ relative willingness to adopt stringent targets.
Federal legislation would, of course, represent the democratic will—
the collective agreement that could be cobbled out among the intense
interests at stake. But letting states set more stringent emission reduction
goals would allow citizens in those states to express political objectives
that might differ from the “least common denominator” that the federal
government achieves.75 If federal legislation does not permit states to
71. See SCOP ING PLAN , supra note 70, at 75 (predicting economic benefits as a
result of increased energy efficiency).
72. See Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 18, 28-32.
73. ANDREEN ET AL ., supra note 9, at 8-9 (noting state interest in more stringent
environmental laws to attract green business); SCOP ING PLAN , supra note 70, at ES-11;
Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 135; Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 26-28 (observing
agricult ural opportunities created by climate policies); id. at 37-41 (des cribing
green technology opportunities); NACAA, PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF STATES, supra
note 25, at 11.
74. See NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF
STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 10-12.
75. Professor Richard Lazarus argues that the federal lawmaking process creates
extensive institutional impediments to achieving environmental protection at the federal
level. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 1183. See also Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A)
(observing that “hardball legislative politics” often results in political compromises that
fail to achieve scientifically justified outcomes).
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set more stringent caps, it will prevent states (and their citizens) from
giving expression to their political views. As Professor Kirsten Engel has
explained, preempting state controls would “cut[] short the lawmaking
process and products of an entire level of democratic government.”76
The “democratic will” argument raises the question of whether states
should be allowed to set goals or caps that are less stringent than federal
goals and caps.77 Some states may perceive fewer benefits because they
perceive less risk from climate change. Some states could also perceive
fewer economic benefits if they are not favorably positioned to develop
renewable energy or green technologies. Heavy reliance on carbonintensive energy sources or energy-intensive industry could also increase
the relative costs, or perceived costs, that states face.78
Notwithstanding potential state opposition to federal standards,
powerful arguments support requiring states to achieve a federal
minimum and preventing them from setting a GHG reduction target less
stringent than the federal target. From a democratic perspective, a
federal floor could enhance, rather than repress, state democracy.79
Without a federal minimum, states risk a “race to the bottom” that
undermines state decision-making.80 A state that would like to maintain
environmental standards could fear that, if other states go below the
federal standard, the state with higher environmental standards would
lose its economic base to the less-regulated state. Notwithstanding the
desire to protect the environment, the state could feel compelled by
interstate economic competition to lower its standards. A federal floor
would allow a state to achieve at least the federal minimum without
risking interstate competition. Ironically, a federal floor thus has the
capacity to serve, rather than frustrate, states’ democratic expression.81
While a “race to the bottom” is not inevitable, requiring states to abide
by a federal minimum prevents a destructive race from emerging.
76. Engel, supra note 25, at 184.
77. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1581, 1586. Some states have strongly resisted
climate initiatives. See Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 11.
78. See Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 11 (noting that regions “dominated by heavy
manufacturing and dependent on coal power for electricity or coal mining for employment”
are likely to view climate policy as a threat to the local economy).
79. States participating in a conference on the relative role of the federal government
and the states stressed the importance of minimum federal requirements. NACAA,
Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES,
supra note 25, at 13.
80. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1580 (noting important role of federal minimums
in helping states avoid the race to the bottom); see generally Kirsten H. Engel, State
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (describing race-to-the-bottom); Esty, supra note 58, at 60304; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 597-98; Stewart, supra note 58, at 1211-12.
81. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1580; Kaswan, supra, note 12, at 799.
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Conceivably, a state could argue that its desire to set emission
reduction goals below the federal minimum is not compelled by a race to
the bottom but accurately reflects its constituents’ balance between
environmental and economic considerations.82 A federal minimum
would continue to be justified, however, because collective action
failures could lead at least some states to impose too low a target.83
Climate change presents a classic tragedy of the commons.84 States are
likely to face most of the costs of controlling stationary sources but must
share the benefits—at least the benefits of reducing GHGs85 —with the
rest of the globe. As a corollary, since states do not experience all of the
adverse consequences of their emissions, they are unlikely to take
sufficient action to control emissions. Many states’ individual
cost/benefit analyses are likely to result in less stringent targets than are
environmentally necessary because the states are unlikely to internalize
the consequences imposed by their emissions upon other states and
nations.86 And although some states have found that the potential
economic benefits of climate-change policies outweigh their costs, that
calculus will not hold for all states. Purported economic benefits are
unlikely to create a sufficient counterweight to the incentives to underregulate. Thus, permitting states to set regulatory targets below
the federal minimum could seriously undermine the nation’s
collective effort to reduce emissions.

82. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
‘Race-to-the-Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that states set environmental policy by balancing their
citizens’ preferences for environmental protection and industrial development, and suggesting
that competition for economic development in the form of differing environmental standards
is not inherently problematic).
83. I and others have described how these collective action impediments justify
floor preemption. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1580; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9,
at 616-17; Kaswan, supra note 12, at 794-96, 824. As Professor Richard Stewart has
stated, “[A] state should not be entitled to invoke the principle of local self-determination
against federal controls where that state generates significant spillovers which impair the
corresponding ability of sister states to determine the environmental quality they shall
enjoy.” Stewart, supra note 80, at 1227.
84. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968)
(elaborating the challenge of protecting the commons).
85. While states would share the benefits of reducing GHGs, they may be able to
reap ancillary benefits: the economic benefits of promoting alternative energy and energy
efficiency and the environmental benefits of reducing co-pollutants. See supra notes 7074 (discussing benefits of climate-change regulation).
86. Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 120-21; Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 7.
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III. MECHANISM S FOR ACHIEVING MORE STRINGENT CAPS
Assuming the importance of allowing states to set more stringent
goals, this section addresses how states would do so. A critical question
is the extent to which states could achieve their stringent reduction goals
by imposing more stringent reduction requirements on sources that are
within the parameters of a federal cap-and-trade program. While a state
could achieve important reductions from changing building codes,
reducing vehicle-miles-travelled through land-use reforms, or promoting
renewable energy, states would lose a key tool in the effort to achieve a
more stringent cap if they could not meet their reduction goals by setting
a lower annual cap for emissions from facilities within their jurisdiction.
Moreover, for a state’s more stringent caps to be effective, a state must
have the ability to prevent facilities in other states from using the “extra”
allowances that more stringent states generate. This section outlines
several potential decentralization forms through which states could
achieve stringency and retire allowances. It not only provides a basis for
visualizing how states could achieve stringency but also lays the
groundwork for assessing the possible adverse consequences of such
efforts.
A. The Need to Retire Allowances
A national trading program creates interdependencies that complicate
a state’s efforts to meet its own goals. Under traditional environmental
programs, state efforts to achieve more demanding state emission targets
impose their primary impact on in-state facilities.87 In contrast, in a
national trading program, the national allowance market links states
together so that one state’s actions could have ripple effects throughout
the entire system. Given these interdependencies, a state cannot effectively
implement more stringent goals without a mechanism to retire the
allowances associated with the state’s additional reductions.
More specifically, the challenge for a state attempting to achieve a
more stringent cap by limiting sources within a national trading program
is that any additional reductions achieved within the state by those
sources would simply free up more allowances for out-of-state sources.
If out-of-state sources use the extra allowances, that would erase the
state’s greater stringency.88 For example, using a greatly oversimplified
87. Cf. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 604 (noting that states imposing more
stringent environmental standards on in-state facilities generally do not cause negative
external impacts on other states).
88. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 294-95; Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part II(C); Farber,
supra note 14, at 918-19; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 645; WHITE PAP ER, supra
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hypothetical, assume that a federal cap-and-trade program set a national
cap of 10,000 tons for the covered sectors and allocated 200 allowances
to a state’s facilities. Assume that that state imposed its own cap of 100,
not 200, tons of emissions—that the state established a cap twice as
stringent as the federal cap. Assume further that the state established
additional requirements on in-state facilities to achieve the more
stringent state cap. As a consequence of the state restrictions, in-state
facilities would use 100 fewer allowances than they received through the
federal program. But in a national allowance market, the allowances
would then simply be available for use by facilities in the other fortynine states. Therefore, the state’s stringency would shift the location of
the emissions, not reduce them. State efforts would be futile and
counter-productive for the stringent state, which would experience the
additional costs of reducing emissions without generating any GHG
reduction benefits, in-state or out. Additionally, in-state sources would
be disadvantaged relative to out-of-state sources because they would
face higher emission-reduction costs while out-of-state sources would
face relatively lower costs, given the greater supply of allowances
afforded to out-of-state sources by the stringent state’s efforts.
Unless the federal government or the stringent states retire the
allowances that make up the difference between the stringent states’ caps
and the proportion of the federal cap associated with those states’
emissions, the stringent states will be unable to achieve more stringent
caps simply by imposing additional requirements on in-state facilities
covered by the federal cap.89 The issue of how such allowances could be
retired, and the impact of that retirement on a state’s sources and on the
trading system as a whole, is a complicated issue that depends upon the
mechanism by which the state attempts to achieve its more stringent cap,
how allowances are retired, and the manner in which federal allowances
are distributed. The rest of this Section addresses these questions.

not e 3, at 15; K aswan, s upra note 12, at 831; L I TZ , s upra note 6, at 29; M eghan
M cGuinness & A. Denny Ellerman, The Effects of Interactions Between Federal and
State Climate Policies, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., CLEAN AIR: L., POL ’Y ,
& PRAC. 175, 199 (2008).
89. Cf. Andreen, supra note 9, at 295; Farber, supra note 14, at 918. Both Andreen and
Farber note that a state’s more stringent goal could be made effective if the state could
retire federal allowances in proportion to its expected reductions.
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B. Potential Forms of Decentralization
In order to visualize mechanisms for achieving state stringency and to
evaluate their potential impacts, it is necessary to first identify the forms
in which that stringency and associated allowance retirement could be
realized. Congress is likely to address the issue of state power within a
federal trading program in general terms, not just by designing narrow
provisions to achieve stringency. I address the following question: given
differing levels of state power within a federal program, what mechanisms
could the states use to achieve stringency? Below, I introduce three
possible decentralization models that offer states increasing levels of
control. Although the models do not contemplate the full array of
options, they provide a starting point for analysis.
Mechanisms for achieving stringency and retiring allowances could be
developed under all three models, and the choice of model does not
significantly impact the most critical policy issues raised by state
stringency.90 Nonetheless, the choice of model impacts the mechanisms
available to the states and the degree to which they must rely upon
additional federal actions to reach their goals.
1. “Light” Decentralization
The light decentralization model envisions a largely national program,
but federal legislation would give states the option of setting more
stringent caps and establishing stationary-source standards that exceed
federal goals or standards. The Clean Air Act follows this model; it
specifically allows states to set both more rigorous air-quality goals and
more stringent source requirements than those set by the federal
government.91 As is discussed further below, states could not achieve
stringency on their own under this model; federal cooperation would be
necessary to retire allowances.

90. While the choice of model does not have significant policy implications for achieving
stringency, the differences in power afforded the states by each model have very significant
implications for other features of climate policy. The choice of a decentralization model
substantially impacts state control within the trading system. This Article focuses on the
issues raised by allowing states to be more stringent; it does not address these additional
issues. For a discussion of the issues raised by allowing states to control trading parameters,
see Kaswan, supra note 10. The choice of model has implications that go well beyond
determining the mechanisms for achieving stringency.
91. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416. The climate-change equivalent to allowing
states to set more rigorous ambient air quality goals would be to allow states to set more
stringent emission-reduction goals.
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2. “Medium” Decentralization
Like the “light” option, the medium decentralization option would
allow states to set more stringent caps and facility standards. Unlike the
light option, it would give states the capacity to achieve stringency
themselves by giving them the authority to impose restrictions on instate facilities’ use of federally distributed allowances. States could, in
essence, create a separate compliance program that would require instate facilities to comply with state as well as federal requirements.
States could require facilities to submit federal allowances pursuant to
state rules. For example, and as discussed further below, states might
require facilities to submit extra allowances to the state, or require them
to submit a higher ratio of federal allowances per ton of emissions in
order to reach more stringent state reduction goals. Proposed federal
legislation at the time of this writing appears to allow this form of
decentralization.92
3. “Heavy” Decentralization
The third option would include all the features of light and medium
decentralization; it would allow states to set more stringent goals and
standards and allow them to establish state compliance requirements
(using federal allowances). It would, however, move substantially
beyond the previous models. The federal government would establish
an emissions budget for all willing states93 and then allow the states to
distribute the federal allowances within their jurisdiction. Most large92. Section 334 of the Waxman-M arkey bill would amend the Clean Air Act to allow
states to “cap greenhouse gas emissions, require surrender to the State or a political
subdivision thereof of emission allowances or offset credits established or issued under
this Act, and require the use of such allowances or credits as a means of demonstrating
compliance with requirements established by a State or political subdivision thereof.”
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 334 (2009). A
parallel bill introduced in the Senate contains the same language. Clean Energy Jobs and
American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong., § 124 (2009). See the following website for
links to Senate summaries, discussion drafts, guides, and other important and helpful documents:
PEWClimate.org, The American Clean Air and Security Act (Waxman-M arkey Bill),
http://www.pewclimate.org/acesa (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
93. In the European Trading System (ETS), allowing member states to set their own
targets apparently contributed to inflated emissions predictions in many states, which in
turn resulted in over-allocation of allowances in the ETS. See PARKER, supra note 27, at
5-6. In order to avoid the risk of states predicting high emissions and therefore generating
too many allowances, this Article assumes that the federal government, not the states,
would set the emissions budgets for any states choosing to allocate their own allowances.
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scale domestic trading programs follow this model, though perhaps by
necessity rather than choice.94 Proposed federal bills under consideration at
the time of this writing do not include this option.
4. Decentralization Options Not Considered
This Article does not address the possibility of separate, parallel state
cap-and-trade programs in which states distribute state allowances for
in-state trading, at least for the sectors and facilities covered by the
federal program.95 This Article also assumes that regional trading
programs, like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Western
Climate Initiative, would be replaced by nationwide trading.96 I exclude
these options to create a more manageable set of state/federal dynamics
and because of the assumption (potentially misplaced) that separate state
or regional programs would be less politically viable than the forms of
decentralization suggested in this Article.97 Federal legislation under
consideration at the time of this writing takes a middle position; it
creates a moratorium on state and regional cap-and-trade programs for
five years from the initiation of the federal trading program.98
94. Since the federal Clean Air Act gives the states, rather than the federal government,
control over meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, regional trading programs
to help states achieve the standards have had to give significant authority to the states
since the federal government lacks the authority to impose its own requirements. See
generally M ichigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 685-88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding the NO x
Budget Program, a multi-state criteria pollutant trading program, because it left states
with considerable discretion in how to meet expected emissions reductions).
95. For an analysis of the implications of co-existing state and federal cap-andtrade programs, see generally M cGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 198-206.
96. These regional organizations may continue to operate in order to coordinate
other regional initiatives, like regional energy development and alternative energy power
grids, but not to run separate trading programs. It is possible that regional entities could
seek to obtain a regional budget for the included states and then follow the regional
program for distributing allowances among the states. Since this would add an additional
layer of administrative effort between federal and state control, it is not clear what
benefits would flow from this structure. Nonetheless, the states involved in the regional
programs are establishing regional parameters and organizing regional auctions that may
continue to serve useful functions even in a federal program. For the purposes of this
Article, however, I will assume that any decentralization would be to the state rather than
the regional level.
97. Trading advocates generally prefer large trading markets in order to maximize
the number of sources and opportunities for low-cost reductions, to send widespread
market signals for technology innovation, and to reduce competitive pressures between
jurisdictions. See LITZ, supra note 6, at 27. As is evidenced by the movement toward
regional trading blocks, states are seeking the opportunity to trade beyond state boundaries. It
is therefore unlikely that states would want to establish separate statewide cap-and-trade
programs that allowed only in-state trading. Similarly, once states have the benefit of
national trading, they may perceive less need for regional trading.
98. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 335
(2009) (establishing Title VIII, section 861).
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C. Achieving State Stringency Under the Light
Decentralization Model
Under the light decentralization model, which mirrors the savings
provisions in traditional pollutant control statutes by allowing states to
set more stringent goals and facility requirements, states could set more
stringent long-term goals and emissions caps for in-state facilities. Since
the light decentralization model would not allow states to control federal
allowances, state stringency could be effective under this model only if
federal legislation created additional mechanisms for retiring the extra
allowances. States could achieve stringency in two ways: (1) by relying
exclusively on federal or state allowance retirement or (2) by imposing
state regulatory emission reduction requirements on in-state facilities
and having the federal government assist them in retiring the extra
allowances.
1. Achieving State Stringency Solely Through
Allowance Retirement
Under the light decentralization model, a state could establish more
stringent goals. If it wanted to achieve those goals by reducing the
supply of allowances to its facilities, however, it would have to rely on
the federal government. A critical factor for determining how to retire
the extra allowances is whether the federal government freely distributes
or instead auctions allowances. If the federal government freely
distributed allowances, then federal legislation could require the relevant
federal agency to assess the state targets, determine how they relate to
the emissions assumed for the facilities in that state, and distribute
proportionately fewer allowances to facilities within the more stringent
state. The federal government could then retire the leftover allowances
associated with that state’s facilities. For example, if the state goal were
twice as stringent as the federal goal, then the federal government could
distribute half the expected allocation to the state’s facilities and retire
the remainder.
Different mechanisms would be needed if the federal government
auctioned allowances. The extra allowances associated with a state’s
more stringent goal must be withheld from the national allowance pool
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for the state’s more stringent goal to be effective. 99 The federal
government could reduce the number of allowances to be auctioned in
proportion to the more stringent state’s emission reduction goals and
retire them, thereby reducing the national allowance supply. Alternatively,
as was proposed in federal legislation in 2008,100 the federal government
could give states the extra federal allowances associated with their more
stringent target and permit the states to retire them. Like direct federal
retirement of the allowances prior to sale, permitting states to retire
allowances from the national market would reduce the national allowance
supply.
2. Achieving State Stringency Through State Regulatory
Requirements Coupled with Allowance Retirement
Alternatively, under the light decentralization model, states themselves
could achieve their more stringent goals by imposing direct GHG
emission reduction requirements, such as efficiency standards or
production process requirements, on covered facilities.101 If regulatory
99. Under the light decentralization model, the state does not have any control over the
number of allowances their facilities buy from or submit to the federal government. The
allowances would therefore have to be taken from the national allowance pool.
100. See Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. §
3302-03 (2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/110/s/s2191rs.pdf;
LITZ, supra note 6, at 31 (comparing options). This option is distinct from the heavy
decentralization model. In the heavy decentralization model, the states would assume
full responsibility for allowance allocation within their states. Under this proposal, in
contrast, the federal government would remain primarily responsible for allowance allocation
and only a small percentage of the allowances would be distributed to the states for
revenue—or stringency—purposes.
101. M ost of the existing climate policies propose to control industrial sources through
cap-and-trade programs rather than regulatory approaches. Proposed federal legislation
creates a cap-and-trade program for most stationary-source facilities and creates a
regulatory process only for sources that do not fall within the trading program. See
generally American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 301-360
(2009) (establishing cap-and-trade program for most sources). Id. § 331 (establishing
Title VIII, section 811, requiring regulatory GHG standards for uncapped stationary
sources). The Senate discussion draft creates a cap-and-trade program but does not
eliminate EPA’s authority to establish regulatory standards. Clean Energy Jobs and
American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 121 (establishing rules for greenhouse gas
standards that only narrowly preempt source controls under the CAA). The Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative establishes a trading program, not a regulatory approach. See
generally Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI Fact Sheet, http://www.rggi.org/
docs/RGGI_Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf (Apr. 22, 2009). The Western Climate
Initiative and the M idwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord contemplate trading programs.
Western Climate Change Initiative, Designing the Program, http://www.westernclimate
initiative.org/designing-the-program (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (describing cap-andtrade as the centerpiece of this regional GHG reduction strategy); M IDWESTERN GOVERNORS
ASSOCIATION , M IDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD 3-4 (2007), available at http://
w w w .midw es t ernaccord.org/midw es t erngreenhous egas reduct ionaccord.p df
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requirements were used to achieve stringency, then the regulated
facilities would generate fewer emissions than presumed under the
federal system.
While state regulations would reduce in-state emissions, they would
not achieve real stringency unless the extra allowances were retired. The
light decentralization model allows the states to impose regulations to
reduce in-state emissions but does not give them a mechanism for
retiring extra allowances. The federal government would have to play
the same role as it would if the state did not regulate. If the federal
government freely distributed allowances, then the federal government
would have to withhold and retire the extra allowances from the
regulated facilities in order to keep the facilities from selling their extra
allowances in the national allowance market.102 If the federal trading
program instead auctioned allowances, then the federal government
would have to withhold the additional reductions achieved by state
regulation from the national allowance pool and either retire them or
give the extra allowances to the state and let the state retire them. As is
discussed further below, while the mechanisms for retiring the
allowances would be the same whether a state achieved reductions
through regulation or purely through allowance retirement, the impacts
on the national allowance market would differ considerably.103
Thus, under the light decentralization model, states could set more
stringent goals and annual caps, but federal legislation must create a

(des cribing M idwestern states’ intent to create a GHG trading program). Except for
certain controls for fugitive emissions and required energy efficiency audits, California
intends to rely primarily upon a cap-and-trade program to control industrial sources. See
generally SCOP ING PLAN, supra note 70, at 54-56. Nonetheless, if a cap-and-trade program
proves ineffectual at prompting needed changes, it is conceivable that states would attempt to
achieve greater results through direct regulation. In Southern California’s RECLAIM
program, for example, the local trading program’s failure to induce utilities to adopt pollution
control technologies led the air district to impose direct regulatory requirements. See
M cAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions
Trading, 59 ADMIN . L. REV. 269, 290 (2007).
102. See M cGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 202.
103. If a s t at e achieves its s tringency t hrough regulation, t hen mos t of t he
reductions will occur within the more stringent state. As a consequence, retiring the
allowances will have little impact on the national allowance market because it simply
accounts for additional reductions that have already occurred. If allowances are retired
without in-state regulation, then that reduces the supply of national allowances with no
as s urance t hat t he reduct ions w ill occur in t he s t at e w it h t he more s t ringent
t arget , externalizing the impact of the state’s more stringent target. These consequences
are discussed further below. See infra Part IV(B).
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mechanism for retiring the block of allowances associated with the
states’ more stringent goals. In order for states themselves to have the
power to retire the extra allowances associated with a more stringent
state cap, they would have to have control over their facilities’ use of
federal allowances, an option available only under the medium and
heavy decentralization models.104
D. Achieving State Stringency Under the Medium
Decentralization Model
Under the medium decentralization model, a state would have greater
flexibility in achieving stringency and retiring allowances. As in the
light decentralization model, it could adopt regulatory restrictions to
achieve stringency, but it could exercise control over allowance
retirement rather than relying on federal action. In addition, the medium
decentralization model would give a state the option of using market
mechanisms, rather than regulatory standards, to achieve greater
stringency.
1. Achieving Stringency by Imposing Regulatory Emissions
Restrictions and Retiring Allowances
Under a medium decentralization model, a state could continue to
achieve its greater stringency through regulatory measures, but it obtains
additional options for retiring allowances. As with the light decentralization
model, the starting assumption is that a state would impose regulatory
restrictions that reduce in-state facility emissions below the emissions
levels presumed by the federal government in its allocation process. If
the federal government distributes allowances for free, the regulated
facilities would receive too many allowances. Letting the facilities sell
the extra allowances would undermine the state’s effort to achieve
stringency. Under a medium decentralization model, a state could
require the regulated facilities to submit the excess allowances to the
state for retirement rather than having to rely on the federal government
to hold back the extra allowances or having the federal government give
the extra allowances to the state to retire. Instead of requiring the
facilities to submit the extra allowances to the state for retirement, the

104. See Farber, supra note 14, at 918 (observing that states are likely to want the
power to control trading in order to effectuate real emission reductions); NACAA,
Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES,
supra not e 25, at 13 (stating t hat federal legis lation could give states t he p ow er
t o ret ire allowances from sources within their jurisdiction).
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same result could be achieved by prohibiting facilities from selling the
extra allowances.105
If the federal government auctioned allowances, however, then the
state regulations would lead regulated facilities to buy fewer allowances
and the “extra” allowances would remain in the national allowance
supply. To retire the extra allowances, the state could require in-state
facilities to submit federal allowances to the state at a greater than oneto-one ratio, a ratio that is proportionate to the program’s greater
stringency. For example, facilities could be required to reduce emissions
and then submit, say, 1.25 allowances, as opposed to one allowance for
every ton of emissions, which would cause facilities to buy more
allowances on the market than they otherwise would have.106 Under this
model, a state would achieve greater stringency through regulation but
retire allowances by controlling its facilities’ use of federal allowances.
2. Achieving Stringency Through Market Mechanisms
Unlike the light decentralization model, the medium decentralization
model gives states the option of using pure market-based allowance
submission requirements, without regulation, to achieve more stringent
goals. A state could achieve a more stringent annual cap by requiring instate facilities to submit to the state a higher ratio of federal allowances
for each ton of emissions.107 That approach would lead to greater

105. Federal legislation would have to make the state power to impose such a restriction
explicit in order to avoid a preemption or Commerce Clause challenge. When New York
State attempted to prohibit in-state facilities from selling allowances to upwind states,
the courts found that federal law preempted and prohibited the state’s limitations. See
Clean Air M kts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003). Explicit authorization
of such state restrictions in federal legislation would help protect such state limitations
from similar challenges. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part III(C) (discussing the risk that
courts could conclude that federal climate legislation preempts state controls).
106. Under this approach, the facilities would bear the cost of retiring the extra
allowances. If a state did not want its industry to bear the cost of retiring the allowances,
then it might prefer to have the federal government withhold allowances from the
national allowance pool in proportion to the in-state regulatory reductions, an option that
does not require a state to use the authority given it under the medium decentralization
model. The issue of who bears the cost of retiring allowances is likely to be a key
question in determining the appropriate mechanism. This Article focuses on federalism
concerns; the relative burden of retiring allowances on government and industry is
beyond the scope of this Article.
107. Cf. M cGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 205 (noting that states could
require in-state source to submit more federal allowances than normally required). If
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stringency because each allowance would represent more reductions
than presumed under the federal program. This approach would
simultaneously and automatically retire the “extra” allowances from the
national market, since the facilities would be required to purchase and
submit the extra allowances associated with the more stringent goal.108
A state could use this mechanism whether the government distributed
allowances for free or by auction.109 Since the states that are actively
addressing climate change have demonstrated a preference for addressing
stationary sources through market mechanisms rather than direct
regulatory requirements,110 this mechanism is likely to be attractive to
the states.
E. Achieving State Stringency Under the Heavy
Decentralization Model
If the federal government gives states the option of distributing federal
allowances, achieving a more stringent state program would be more
straightforward than under the light and medium decentralization
models. The federal government would determine the states’ emissions
budgets and give the states the allowances for in-state distribution.111
The states could then retire the allowances associated with their more
stringent goal before distributing or auctioning the allowances to in-state
facilities. The states could choose whether or not to couple their
allowance retirement with direct regulations to achieve stringency.

federal allowances are auctioned rather than distributed for free, these facilities will face
relatively high costs.
108. See WHITE PAP ER, supra note 3, at 15 n.52 (noting that federal legislation
could create a mechanism for states to retire allowances by “authorizing States to require
entities they regulate to turn in Federal allowance as part of the State program”).
109. While this option would operate in the same way regardless of whether the federal
government distributed allowances for free or auctioned, the financial implications for
affected facilities would differ considerably.
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (detailing state preference for capand-trade).
111. See WHITE PAP ER, supra note 3, at 15 n.52 (observing that federal legislation
could create a mechanism for retiring allowances by “allocating Federal allowances to
States and authorizing them to retire allowances”); LITZ, supra note 6, at 29 (describing
same scenario); NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF
STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 13. An EPA cap-and-trade program to control
mercury emissions, since invalidated by the courts, followed the heavy decentralization
model and allowed states to withhold a portion of the federally distributed budget in
order to meet a more stringent reduction goal. See M cGuinness & Ellerman, supra note
88, at 183.
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F. Conclusion
The mechanisms states could use to achieve stringency and retire
allowances differ considerably depending upon the power they are given
within a federal trading program. States could set their own targets, and
impose their own direct emission reduction regulations, under all three
of the decentralization models discussed above. But states that prefer
market mechanisms to regulation could employ market approaches only
under the medium and heavy decentralization models.112 Moreover,
states can control the allowance retirement process only under the
medium and heavy decentralization models; otherwise they must rely
upon federal retirement of the extra allowances.
IV. THE P OTENTIAL DRAWBACKS TO ALLOWING GREATER
STATE STRINGENCY
The foregoing analysis provides a basis for assessing the potential
adverse consequences of allowing states to implement more stringent
emission reduction targets. The most significant potential drawback is
the impact on the national allowance market. Because a national trading
program links the states, some of the mechanisms described above could
impact allowance prices in states that have not chosen to adopt more
stringent standards. Other drawbacks are ones that have long been
associated with the nation’s cooperative federalist environmental
statutes: the potentially higher cost of goods and energy exported by the
more stringent states, the lack of national uniformity generated by state
variations, and the administrative inefficiency of overlapping state and
federal jurisdiction.

112. As discussed above, under the light decentralization model the states could use
market mechanisms in coordination with the federal government: the states could set
their targets and then have the federal government retire the allowances from the national
allowance supply, indirectly using market mechanisms. See supra notes 99 to 100 (discussing
pure allowance retirement option under the light decentralization model). But the light
decentralization option would not permit the states themselves to impose direct market
measures.

135

K ASWAN (D O N OT D E LET E)

2/15/2016 9:14 AM

A. Impact on the National Allowance Market if
Allowances are not Retired
State efforts to achieve stringency will, by definition, impact the flow
of allowances and, therefore, impact the national allowance market. If
federal legislation does not create mechanisms to retire the excess
federal allowances associated with more stringent state programs, not
only will state efforts to be more stringent fail,113 but the extra
allowances are likely to depress national allowance prices.114 Cheaper is
not always better. If allowance prices are too low, then they will not
create incentives for industries to adopt existing measures to reduce
emissions.115 Low allowance prices would also fail to create a market
signal to stimulate technological innovation, since low allowance prices
will induce facilities to buy allowances rather than new technology.
Technological innovators are unlikely to invest in research and
development if low allowance prices will preclude a future market for
their products.116 In addition, low allowance prices would have little
impact on energy prices. As a consequence, they would fail to create
market signals for lowering consumer energy demand through energy
efficiency and alternative energy investments.117

113. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing how the failure to retire
allowances would erase a state’s effort to achieve greater stringency).
114. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 645-46 (noting the need to retire the
allowances associated with more stringent state caps in order to reduce emissions and avoid a
flood of allowances that could depress allowance values in other states); M cGuinness &
Ellerman, supra note 88, at 199 (observing that more stringent state standards could lead
to less demand for federal allowances and lower federal allowance prices); id. at 205
(observing that allowing states to retire federal allowances would prevent states’ more
stringent programs from depressing national allowance prices). A federal price floor that
sets a minimum price for allowances could also address the risk of depressed prices.
115. See M cAllister, supra note 15, at 419.
116. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change
Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 AZ. L. REV. 835, 850, 853 (2008) (observing
t hat t here is s ome correlation between increases in energy prices and t echnology
innovation); M cAllister, supra note 15, at 422. While low allowance prices are likely to
dampen technology innovation incentives, high allowance prices do not guarantee innovation
given the complex range of factors that influence technology innovation decisions. See
Adelman & Engel, supra at 850, 853-55.
117. See M ARILYN A. BROWN ET AL ., BROOKINGS INST., SHRINKING THE CARBON
FOOTP RINT OF M ETROP OLITAN AMERICA 26 (2008) (noting that in the past, energy prices
lead to less oil consumption). As with innovation incentives, low energy prices dampen
incentives for efficiency, but high allowance prices do not guarantee efficiency investments
due to the complex factors that determine efficiency investments. See generally Alice Kaswan,
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 276-80 (2009)
(describing why market signals are unlikely to trigger sufficient efficiency investments).
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B. Impact on the National Allowance Market if
Allowances are Retired
While retiring allowances is essential to avoid depressing national
allowance prices, some methods of allowance retirement could cause
national allowance prices to increase. This section explores the impacts
of the mechanisms discussed above. The choice of decentralization
model—whether light, medium, or heavy—is critical to determining the
state’s range of options and its autonomy in exercising them, but the
choice of model is not the dominant issue in determining the impact on
the national allowance market. As is discussed further below, the most
critical issue is whether the state uses regulation or market mechanisms
to achieve its more stringent goal. The discussion below analyzes the
range of potential impacts, beginning with the options having the least
impact.
1. Little Impact: Stringency Achieved by Regulation
If a state uses regulation to achieve a more stringent annual cap, and
the state or federal government retires the associated reductions, there
should be little effect on the national allowance market. At least in
theory, under a regulatory approach, all of the extra reductions would be
made in-state. The retired allowances represent allowances that the instate facilities would have been entitled to (or been expected to
purchase) but for the additional regulations. Retiring the allowances
associated with the stringent state’s extra reductions does not impact the
pool of allowances presumptively associated with emissions from
facilities in other states. Assuming that the amount retired matches the
extra amount reduced, there should be little impact on the supply of
allowances to facilities in the rest of the nation and, as a consequence,
little impact on national allowance prices. The decentralization model
and mode of allowance retirement would not affect the outcome, since in
all cases the retired allowances would be associated with in-state
emission reductions.
However, two factors could lead to some impact on the national
allowance market even if regulations lead to in-state emission
reductions. The first is leakage. It is possible that state regulations
would reduce emissions in-state but, as a consequence, increase out-of-
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state emissions.118 Emissions that appeared to have been reduced would,
in fact, have simply shifted. For example, a refinery might meet a state’s
regulatory requirements by lowering or stopping production, and out-ofstate refineries might increase supply to make up for the reductions in
the more stringent state. Although in-state refinery emissions would
decrease, out-of-state refinery emissions would increase. Retiring the
allowances associated with the in-state emission reductions would
remove allowances on the premise that the associated emissions were
gone, thus reducing the allowance supply available to cover the nation’s
actual emissions.
The second factor that could affect whether regulations, coupled with
allowance retirement, impact the national allowance market is whether
the more stringent state has a disproportionate number of either high- or
low-cost reducers. If the more stringent state contains many low-cost
reducers who are required to reduce by regulation and whose associated
allowances are retired, then higher-cost reducers in other states will lose
the opportunity to purchase allowances that low-cost reducers in the
more stringent state would otherwise have been allowed to generate for
profit. National allowance prices could go up if the market is deprived
of these low-cost opportunities.
Conversely, if the more stringent state has high-cost reducers that are
nonetheless required to reduce emissions pursuant to state regulation,
then the national demand for allowances could be reduced, since these
facilities, which might otherwise have purchased allowances, are now
being required to reduce. That could slightly lower national allowance
prices.
2. Medium Impact: Stringency Achieved by Market Mechanisms
Imposed on a Stringent State’s Facilities
If the federal government or the state uses market mechanisms to
achieve greater stringency and retire allowances, then most of the impact
would be felt by in-state facilities but there could be some external
impact. As described above, market options include having the federal
government or the state distribute fewer allowances to facilities in the
more stringent state or having a state require its facilities to submit more
federal allowances per unit of emissions. In order to avoid the cost of
purchasing allowances, facilities that receive fewer allowances or are

118. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA . L. REV. 1961 (2007) (providing detailed analysis of
leakage risk); Adelman & Engel, supra note 116, at 843-45 (describing leakage risk and
studies assessing its likelihood).
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required to submit extra allowances will likely reduce emissions by more
than they would have otherwise. To the extent they reduce emissions,
the impact of the state’s more stringent goal will primarily remain instate. If leakage occurs, however, some of the apparent reductions in
response to the state’s market incentives could lead to increased
emissions elsewhere, pushing up the demand for allowances.119
Rather than reducing emissions, facilities subject to market
mechanisms to achieve greater stringency could choose to purchase more
allowances. Such increased demand for allowances would increase
allowance prices for facilities nationwide.120 In-state facilities would
still bear the brunt of the state’s stringency because they would have to
either reduce emissions more or buy more allowances, but this option
imposes a greater impact on the market than having a state use direct
regulations to reduce in-state emissions.
A critical factor in determining the extent of the external impact is the
proportion of high-cost emission reducers in the state. High-cost
emission reducers are more likely to buy allowances than reduce
emissions. The greater the number of high-cost reducers, the more the
state restrictions will lead to allowance purchases rather than in-state
reductions, and the relatively greater the impact on the national
allowance market. A state’s low-cost emissions reducers are more likely
to reduce emissions rather than buy allowances, so the more low-cost
reducers in a state, the less the impact on the national allowance market.
Ultimately, however, it is difficult to predict the extent to which the
more stringent state’s requirements would lead to in-state reductions
versus increased allowance purchases. Hence, it is difficult to predict
the extent of the out-of-state impact.
3. High Impact: Allowances Retired Prior to Auction
without State Regulation
The options with the greatest external impact are those in which the
federal government or the state retire allowances before they are sold in
a national auction, unaccompanied by state regulation that would insure

119. Cf. supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing how state regulations
could lead to leakage that results in a shift rather than a reduction in emissions).
120. See M cGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 205 (observing that allowing
states to retire federal allowances “[w]ould . . . effectively reduce the federal cap thereby
raising the allowance price and costs to all other states”).
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that the reductions are made by facilities in the more stringent state.
Retiring allowances prior to auction would reduce the nation’s
allowance supply and increase allowance prices throughout the nation.
The impact on out-of-state facilities would be as great as the impact on
in-state facilities.
The presence or absence of state regulation plays a critical role in
determining whether retiring allowances prior to auction will impact the
national allowance market. Retiring allowances prior to auction results
in a high impact only if the state is not achieving its more stringent goal
through regulation, since retiring allowances prior to a federal auction
does not impose any particular obligations on the facilities in the more
stringent state and simply lessens the supply for facilities in all states. If,
however, the more stringent state has imposed direct regulations that
require in-state facilities to make extra reductions in order to meet the
more stringent state’s goals, then retiring allowances prior to auction
simply removes the excess allowances, no longer needed in the more
stringent state, from the market, without affecting the pool of allowances
available to facilities in all the other states.
4. Impacts Organized by Decentralization Model
State options for achieving stringency are likely to be one consideration
in a broader debate about state powers within a federal cap-and-trade
program. This section therefore organizes the options for—and national
allowance market impacts of—achieving greater stringency that are
available under the light, medium, and heavy decentralization models.
The analysis is intended to help policymakers determine the potential
implications of achieving stringency under each of the decentralization
models. This section does not present new information; it simply
organizes the analysis presented above by decentralization model.
a. Light Decentralization Model
Table 1 summarizes the national allowance market impacts that could
result from the retirement mechanisms available under the light
decentralization model. Under the light decentralization model, the
federal government could facilitate the state’s target by distributing
fewer allowances to facilities in the more stringent state and ensuring
that the extra allowances are retired. As noted above, that approach
would have a “medium” impact, since the in-state facilities would likely
respond to receiving fewer allowances by both reducing emissions and
buying allowances in the national allowance market, creating somewhat
higher allowance prices. In an auction scenario, the federal government
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could facilitate a state’s more stringent goal by withholding
allowances from the national allowance pool and retiring them itself
or by giving them to the state to retire. That approach would have a high
impact since the entire nation would experience the decrease in
allowances, not just the facilities in the more stringent state.
TABLE 1
LIGHT DECENTRALIZATION MODEL: RETIREM ENT MECHANISM
IM PACTS ON NATIONAL ALLOWANCE MARKET
ST AT E
REGULAT ION
TO A CHIEVE
ST RINGENCY?

FEDERAL
A LLOWANCE
A LLOCAT ION
M ET HOD

RET IREMENT
M ECHANISM

IMPACT ON
NAT IONAL
A LLOWANCE
M ARKET

No Regulation

Free
Distribution

Medium

No Regulation

Auction

No Regulation

Auction

Regulation

Free
Distribution

Regulation

Auction

Regulation

Auction

Feds distribute
fewer allowances
to stringent
state’s facilities
Feds retire
allowances
before auction
Feds give states
allowances and
states retire prior
to sale
Feds distribute
fewer allowances
to stringent
state’s facilities
Feds retire
allowances
before auction
Feds give states
allowances and
states retire prior
to auction

High

High

Low

Low

Low
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In contrast, if a state were to achieve stringency through regulations
requiring actual reductions from in-state facilities and the extra
allowances associated with the additional reductions were retired, there
should be little impact on the national allowance supply (and prices)
since the regulated facilities would neither demand nor sell any extra
allowances.
b. Medium Decentralization Model
Table 2 summarizes the national allowance market impacts that could
result from the retirement mechanisms available under the medium
decentralization model. Under the medium decentralization model,
states could impose their own compliance processes for federal
allowances. If a state imposed regulations that required facilities to
reduce emissions and then required facilities to submit the extra
allowances they receive to the state, there should again be little impact
on the availability of national allowances, since the extra reductions and
the associated allowances are all being accounted for in-state. The same
result would obtain if the federal government auctioned allowances and
the state captured the extra allowances by requiring the regulated
facilities to submit a higher ratio of allowances per ton of emissions.
In contrast, if the state did not set regulatory requirements but, instead,
required facilities to submit more allowances per ton of emissions, then
the state’s approach to achieving stringency could have a medium impact
on the market. While in-state facilities would likely reduce emissions to
some extent, the enhanced allowance submission requirements are likely
to lead some facilities to purchase more allowances on the national
market, reducing supply and increasing prices.

142

K ASWAN (D O N OT D E LET E)

2/15/2016 9:14 AM

Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade?

[VOL . 1: 103, 2009]

SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW

TABLE 2
MEDIUM DECENTRALIZATION MODEL: RETIREM ENT MECHANISM
IM PACTS ON NATIONAL ALLOWANCE MARKET
ST AT E
REGULAT ION
TO A CHIEVE
ST RINGENCY?

FEDERAL
A LLOWANCE
A LLOCATION
M ET HOD

RET IREMENT
M ECHANISM

IMPACT ON
NAT IONAL
A LLOWANCE
M ARKET

Regulation

Free
Distribution

Low

Regulation

Auction

No Regulation

Free
Distribution

No Regulation

Auction

State requires in-state
facilities to submit
extra allowances and
retires them
State requires in-state
facilities to submit
higher ratio of
allowances to emissions
State requires in-state
facilities to submit
extra allowances to
the state
State requires in-state
facilities to submit
higher ratio of
allowances to emissions

Low

Medium

Medium

c. Heavy Decentralization Model
Table 3 summarizes the national allowance market impacts that could
result from the retirement mechanisms available under the heavy
decentralization model. Under the heavy decentralization model, in
which the federal government would give states an emissions budget for
them to distribute, a state’s use of regulatory versus market measures to
achieve stringency is, again, key. If the state regulates, and withholds
allowances in proportion to the regulation, then the state’s efforts should
have little impact on the national allowance market. If the state does not
regulate, however, and simply distributes fewer allowances than are in
the emissions budget it receives from the federal government, then there
could be a medium impact on the national allowance market because in-
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state facilities might make up some of the difference by purchasing
additional allowances from the national market.
TABLE 3
HEAVY DECENTRALIZATION MODEL: RETIREM ENT MECHANISM
IM PACTS ON NATIONAL ALLOWANCE MARKET
ST AT E
REGULAT ION
TO A CHIEVE
ST RINGENCY?

FEDERAL
A LLOWANCE
A LLOCATION
M ET HOD

RET IREMENT
M ECHANISM

IMPACT ON
NAT IONAL
A LLOWANCE
M ARKET

Regulation

N/A

Low

No
Regulation

N/A

State withholds extra
allowances prior to
distributing or auctioning
them
State withholds extra
allowances prior to
distributing or auctioning
them

Medium

B. Other External Impacts: Higher Costs Associated with
Greater Stringency
While impacts on the national allowance market are the most novel
and significant potential consequence of allowing states to set more
stringent targets, allowance market impacts are not the only potential
external impact of unilateral state action. Most of the mechanisms for
achieving stringency described above would impose their primary
impact on in-state facilities. Even so, higher in-state costs can
have indirect impacts on consumers in other states.121 For example, if a
stringent state imposes more demanding requirements on electricitygenerating units that export electricity out-of-state, out-of-state
electricity prices could rise. In addition, more stringent requirements on
manufacturers could impose higher costs on out-of-state purchasers.

121.

144

See Andreen, supra note 9, at 294.

K ASWAN (D O N OT D E LET E)

[VOL . 1: 103, 2009]

2/15/2016 9:14 AM

Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade?
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW

C. Uniformity
A common industry concern with state autonomy is its potential
impact on national uniformity.122 Differing state caps are likely to lead
to higher costs and, potentially, differing requirements for facilities in
the more stringent state in comparison with facilities elsewhere in the
nation. The lack of uniformity raises two primary concerns. The first is
administrative complexity. Different requirements in different states
could complicate compliance efforts for national and multinational
companies.123 The second, and more significant, concern is equity—the
creation of an unequal playing field. Under most of the scenarios
described above, facilities in more stringent states are likely to incur
higher costs because they would have to pay for either additional
emission reductions or additional allowances (with their flexibility to
choose between these options dependent upon the state’s chosen
mechanism for achieving a more stringent cap).124 That could place
facilities in stringent states at a competitive disadvantage in national
markets.125
Another potential consequence of non-uniform regulation is that it
could result in “leakage;” it could prompt facilities or production in
states with more stringent caps to shift to less heavily regulated states.126
Leakage would negate a state’s effort to achieve stringency because
those efforts would simply shift the location of the emissions to a lessregulated state. While the more stringent state might meet its own more
stringent target, that state’s regulation would not have contributed to a
net drop in emissions.

122. See WHITE PAP ER, supra note 3, at 2 (observing that “[i]ndustry is often
interested in Federal legislation to avoid or replace a patchwork of State regulations);
Andreen, supra note 9, at 292-93 (describing argument); DeShazo & Freeman, supra
note 3, at 1530-31.
123. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 292-93 (describing argument).
124. If a state required reductions through regulatory measures, facilities would be
required to incur reduction costs. If a state imposed market-based requirements, facilities
could choose whether to meet them through greater reductions or purchasing additional
allowances.
125. See LITZ, supra note 6, at 12 (describing industry concern that state climate change
policy could create an uneven playing field).
126. See generlly Wiener, supra note 118 (providing detailed analysis of leakage risks);
Adelman & Engel, supra note 116, at 843-45 (describing leakage risk and studies assessing
its likelihood).
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D. Administrative Efficiency
Governmental administrative efficiency concerns also arise from some
of the options under which a state could achieve a more stringent cap.127
If a state establishes regulatory requirements, then facilities would have
to add greenhouse gas controls into their state permits in addition to
complying with the federal trading program. If a state exercises powers
under the medium decentralization model and requires facilities to
submit federal allowances to the state, then both state and federal
administrative resources will be implicated. Unless federal legislation
delegates compliance responsibility to the states, facilities would have to
demonstrate compliance at both the state and federal levels. In addition,
unless the federal legislation delegates monitoring and enforcement
responsibilities to the states, duplicative and inefficient monitoring,
inspection, and enforcement proceedings could occur.
V. BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND THE DRAWBACKS
Allowing states to be more stringent requires policymakers to consider
tradeoffs. This section recapitulates the benefits of allowing states to be
more stringent and then assesses both the likelihood that allowing states
to be more stringent would result in adverse impacts and the relative
severity of the impacts should they occur.
A. The Compelling Justifications for Allowing States
to be More Stringent
As discussed at length above, political realities create a risk that
federal legislation and implementation will fail to establish long-term
reduction goals or annual caps that are sufficiently stringent.128 The
overall goals may fail to sufficiently avert the risk of climate change, the
pace may be too slow, and political and economic pressures may lead to
overly generous annual caps. Even if initial goals and caps appear
appropriate at the outset, scientific advances in climate science and
alternative energy may render past goals inappropriate. While there is
no guarantee that states will fill the gap, federal legislation should allow
state regulation to create regulatory redundancy to reduce the risk of one
monolithic federal failure.
Furthermore, most federal pollution control laws have long respected
the nation’s commitment to federalism and permitted state citizens to set
127. See WHITE PAP ER, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that “[m]ore stringent State programs
might . . . increase the governmental . . . resources needed to achieve the necessary reductions”).
128. See discussion supra Part II(B).
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more stringent environmental goals and standards. Many states have
GHG emissions as large or larger than entire nations.129 Precluding
them from achieving more stringent GHG emission reduction goals
would significantly interfere with their democratic prerogatives and is
inappropriate absent a sufficiently compelling justification. The issue,
then, is whether the potential adverse impacts of state efforts provide a
sufficiently compelling justification for preventing states from being
more stringent.
B. Addressing the Potential Adverse Impacts of
Allowing State Stringency
In determining the potential adverse impacts of allowing states to be
more stringent, two factors are worth considering: (1) the likelihood that
states would impose more stringent caps, which affects the extent of the
projected adverse impacts and (2) if states do set more stringent caps, the
significance of the impacts.
1. States are Unlikely to be More Stringent Unless Greater
Stringency is Necessary
As Professor Flatt argues in this Symposium issue, if the federal
program is sufficiently stringent, then states are unlikely to take more
aggressive action. 130 More stringent caps could impose an economic
disadvantage on a state’s existing utilities and industries.131 States are
unlikely to impose such impacts unless the state believes that the
alternative—the federal system—is unacceptable.
It is true, notwithstanding the potential economic costs of climate
policies, that states have been and may continue to enact aggressive
climate policies in order to reap their economic benefits. But those
benefits would also flow from a federal cap, so states are unlikely to
enact more stringent state targets unless the federal government’s cap is
insufficient to stimulate the hoped-for economic benefits.132 For
129. See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE , CLIMATE CHANGE 101: STATE
ACTION 1 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-State-Jan09.pdf.
130. See generally Flatt, supra note 3.
131. See Flatt, supra note 3, at Part VI.
132. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing potential economic
benefits of climate change policies). States may well enact climate policies like energy
efficiency or renewable energy to garner in-state benefits like co-pollutant controls, lower
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example, California anticipates substantial cost savings from energy
efficiency.133 These benefits would flow from a stringent federal cap as
well as from state action; if the federal cap is sufficient, there is no need
for additional state action. Similarly, states that hope to lead the nation
in green technology are unlikely to deem greater in-state stringency
necessary unless the federal cap is insufficiently stringent to prompt
green technology investment.
More stringent state caps do not offer the type of exclusive,
concentrated benefits to a state that would prompt greater state
stringency notwithstanding a sufficient federal cap.134 Thus, the primary
situation in which states are likely to impose more stringent goals is
when the federal program proves fundamentally weak or ineffective—
precisely the situation in which such state control is most justified.
Implementation of the Clean Air Act provides a useful example of
state reluctance to set more stringent goals unless the federal approach is
palpably inadequate. Under the Clean Air Act, states retain the authority
to set more stringent ambient air quality goals and facility standards than
the minimums required by federal legislation.135 In general, the states
have not exercised that discretion with regard to ambient air quality
goals.136 However, when the federal government proposed a trading
system to control mercury emissions from power plants that would not
be as protective as the imposition of regulatory controls, many states
exercised their prerogative and adopted their own approach—more
stringent direct regulation of mercury sources.137 As Professor Flatt has
documented, similar state regulation emerged for other hazardous air
energy costs, or green job promotion. The policies could result in lowering in-state emissions
more than projected by the federal program. The fact that a state might impose measures that
reduce its emissions more than p rojected by t he federal p rogram does not necess arily
mean t hat the state w ill choose t o enact a more stringent target. States seeking these
economic benefits may not be concerned about the availability of extra allowances in
other states, as long as they can accomplish their internal objectives. In other words, the
incentives for state climate action do not necessarily translate into an incentive for state
stringency.
133. See supra note 71.
134. Cf. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 639-40 (observing that “aggressive
regulation of GHGs by states and localities cannot produce concentrated environmental
amenities” and suggesting that states are therefore unlikely to overregulate). In contrast,
certain types of state regulation do pose some risk that states would regulate to enhance
in-s t ate industries. F or examp le, t here is evidence t hat s t at es have imp os ed
fuels requirements to enhance in-state fuel refiners. See Rabe et al., s upra not e
62, at 32-33.
135. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006).
136. See Flatt, supra note 3, at Part III.
137. Steven D. Cook, 23 States Pursuing Stricter Mercury Controls than Required
Under EPA Clean Air Rules, 37 ENV’T REP . 2381 (2006). The EPA program the states
found insufficient has since been invalidated. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583-84
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
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pollutants when the federal government was slow to regulate.138 Giving
states the option of setting more stringent goals and standards is,
therefore, unlikely to lead to state divergence unless and until the federal
government fails to develop adequate controls. The current flurry of
state climate-change initiatives has arisen in part because of the
absence of federal requirements. If the federal government assumes
the mantle of regulation adequately, states are likely to defer to the
federal program.
2. The Relative Significance of Adverse Impacts
If states do choose to adopt more stringent targets, a step they are most
likely to take in the face of federal inadequacy, the question remains: is
that state action worth its drawbacks? The impacts on the national
allowance market present a new challenge to state regulation of
environmental problems, while most of the other drawbacks, like a lack
of uniformity and potential administrative redundancies, have long been
accepted under existing federal environmental laws.
a. External Impacts on the National Allowance Market
When a state imposes external impacts on other states, it causes other
states to endure a harm over which they have no control. Other states
have not had the opportunity to determine whether the harm is worth the
benefits obtained. Moreover, if states do not experience the full costs of
their regulation, then they could have an incentive to overregulate.
Professors Glicksman and Levy state that “[t]he case for displacing state
regulatory authority is strongest with respect to those areas in which
each state has incentives to make regulatory decisions that serve the
state’s own interests while damaging the interests of the collective.”139
If state regulations lead to internal benefits and external costs, the states
could regulate more heavily than would be optimal because they are able
to reap the benefits without experiencing the full costs of their

138. See generally Victor B. Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of
Federal Hazardous Air Pollution Regulation and What We Can Learn from the States,
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 122-61 (2007).
139. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 602; WHITE PAP ER, supra note 3, at 23.
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regulation.140 The policy calculus is more complicated, however, when
most of the costs are internal and only some of them are external, thus
weakening the risk of overregulation. These observations lead to the
following conclusions.
i. Allowance Retirement Mechanisms are Necessary to Avoid
Adverse Impacts on the National Allowance Market
Since a failure to retire allowances would have a significant external
impact—depressing national allowance prices—mechanisms to allow
state stringency must provide a mechanism for retiring allowances. That
mechanism is particularly important if a state achieves its greater
stringency through regulation because regulatory approaches would
concentrate the reductions in the more stringent state and, accordingly,
reduce that state’s demand for, and the prices of, national allowances.141
ii. Achieving State Stringency through Regulation and Associated
Allowance Retirement is Justified Due to the Minor
Impact on the National Allowance Market
States should be allowed to achieve more stringent goals through
regulation coupled with allowance retirement since that approach will
have relatively little impact on the national allowance market. Under a
regulatory approach, the extra reductions would be made in the more
stringent state, and the retired allowances would simply account for the
state’s reduction in demand.142
The primary risk is leakage—that state regulations will lead to
increased emissions (and demand for allowances) outside the state rather
than truly reducing emissions. In that case, retiring the associated
allowances could lead to a shortage of allowances for the true emissions,
potentially increasing prices.143 However, since leakage would negate
the effectiveness of a state’s effort to achieve stringency, states are likely
140. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 638 (suggesting that ceiling preemption
“is not justified unless there are collective action problems that create incentives for
states to overregulate”).
141. A regulatory approach would impose the greatest downward pressure on national
allowance prices since all of the stringent state’s reductions would occur internally and
all of the excess allowances would flow out of state. While a market approach would induce
facilities to reduce emissions to some extent, the market-based requirements could also induce
them to purchase additional allowances, decreasing the impact of the state’s stringency
on the national allowance market.
142. See supra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing impact of state regulatory approach).
143. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing role of leakage in
affect ing t he impact of regulat ory meas ures and allow ance ret irement on t he
nat ional allowance market).
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to avoid regulatory measures that would result in leakage. There is little
point in regulating your own facilities if the emissions will simply pop
up elsewhere. Internal self-interest should thus reduce (though not
eliminate) the threat that state regulations and allowance retirement
would otherwise pose to the national allowance market.144
iii. Achieving State Stringency through Market Mechanisms is
Justified Notwithstanding Some Impact on the
National Allowance Market
Although the resolution is more difficult, states should also have the
option of achieving their greater stringency through market mechanisms,
not just direct regulation. Such market mechanisms include having
federal or state governments distribute fewer allowances or having the
state require facilities to submit more allowances per ton of emissions.
In those instances, some external impacts on the national allowance
market could occur if the facilities choose to respond to the enhanced
requirements by purchasing additional allowances rather than simply
reducing emissions.
The benefit of giving states the flexibility to use market measures
outweighs the potential external impacts. As I have argued elsewhere,
regulatory approaches can and should be an important component of
climate-change policy.145 Nonetheless, most states and the federal
government are relying principally on market mechanisms rather than
regulatory approaches to control stationary-source GHG emissions.146
Industry appears more willing to accept market mechanisms than
regulatory strategies, creating a greater possibility of political consensus
around market approaches.147 Government regulators may seek to avoid
the uncertainty, time, and potential litigation that could be associated
with regulatory approaches and prefer to simply to set allowance

144. St at e s elf-interest w ould not eliminat e t he ris k becaus e s t at es could
underestimate the leakage that results from their regulations.
145. See generally Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate
Change Policy, 38 ENVTL . L. REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,287, 10,304-05 (2008).
146. See supra note 101 (describing current reliance on cap-and-trade).
147. See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP , A BLUEP RINT FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACTION : CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. CLIMATE PROTECTION LEGISLATION 6
(2009), available at http://ww w.us-cap .org/pdf/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf; DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 3, at 1544.
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requirements and require facilities to adjust emissions accordingly.148 If
properly designed, market mechanisms could also create long-term
transformative incentives that extend beyond the end-of-the-pipe
approach that most regulations have achieved.149 While this is not the
place to evaluate the difficult policy choice between regulatory and
market mechanisms, it is clear that precluding states from achieving
stringency though market mechanisms would significantly impede state
policy choices.
Moreover, while worthy of concern in their own right, the external
impacts resulting from state market mechanisms are unlikely to generate
one of the most significant adverse consequences of externalized
impacts: the risk that a state would overreach when it can externalize the
consequences of its actions. Since in-state facilities would experience a
significantly greater impact than out-of-state facilities, the risk of overregulation is low, reducing the potential adverse consequences of the
external costs.150 Moreover, as discussed above, states are unlikely to
reap enough sufficiently discrete benefits from more stringent caps to be
tempted to do so without good cause.151
In addition, if states set more stringent goals because they believe that
federal goals are insufficient, they are in fact providing a national
benefit: helping to avert catastrophic climate change. Where unilateral
state action provides external benefits as well as external costs, the
presence of external benefits helps justify the imposition of external
costs. And the risk of states overregulating in order to garner in-state
benefits is less pronounced where the state is, in effect, sharing the
benefits of its actions with other states.
148. M arket advocates critique the relative administrative inefficiency of traditional
regulatory approaches. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN . L. REV. 1333, 1342-43 (1985) (describing market-based
systems as more administratively efficient than regulatory programs). The assertion is
not without its critics. See M cAllister, supra note 101 (suggesting that trading programs
are not necessarily more administratively efficient than traditional regulatory programs).
149. M arket advocates frequently refer to the technology innovation incentives created
by market mechanisms. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 148, at 1336, 134950 (describing innovation incentives). This assertion is also not without its critics. See,
e.g., David Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Replacing
the Command-and-Control Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH . & LEE L. REV.
289 (1998) (suggesting that trading programs do not necessarily promote incentives for
adopting or developing expensive technology).
150. See supra Part IV(B)(2); Butler & M acey, supra note 59, at 47 (noting that
state restrictions with out-of-state impacts often impose the highest costs on in-state
consumers, thus limiting the risk of states over-regulating); WHITE PAP ER, supra note 3,
at 23 (suggesting that a state role is appropriate “where a State decides to impose a
burden on its own citizens and industry without imposing a significant burden outside the
State”); Kaswan, supra note 12, at 802-03.
151. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.

152

K ASWAN (D O N OT D E LET E)

[VOL . 1: 103, 2009]

2/15/2016 9:14 AM

Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade?
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW

In sum, market measures to achieve stringency are justified
notwithstanding their potential impact on the national allowance market.
Forcing states to use regulatory approaches could unduly constrain their
policy choices. And the risk of overreaching is mitigated by the internal
costs that states are likely to experience from their more stringent goals
and the relatively limited benefits they would obtain from their
promotion of stringency. Moreover, the external benefits of allowing
state stringency mitigate the external costs.
iv. The Toughest Call: Retiring Allowances from the
National Pool without State Regulation
The most significant external impact on the national allowance market
arises where allowances are auctioned, the state does not achieve
stringency through regulation, and the federal or state governments retire
the allowances associated with the more stringent goals from the
national allowance pool. Under that scenario, the national allowance
pool would be reduced, allowance prices would increase, and the nation
as a whole would experience the costs of a state’s decision to be more
stringent. The external costs associated with this mechanism are much
more significant than for the other mechanisms. In addition, since the
adverse impacts of seeking stringency would not be concentrated in the
more stringent state, the disincentives to overregulation would be
correspondingly weaker.
However, as noted above, state efforts to achieve stringency do not
present as strong a risk of overregulation as other potential forms of state
regulation. While a state imposing more stringent limits under this
approach would not incur state-specific costs, it is also unlikely to
experience significant economic gains, or at least gains tangible enough
to prompt such a step, unless the federal program is insufficient.152
Moreover, as noted above, to the extent more stringent states are making
152. Conceivably, a state could take this approach if it hoped to stimulate its green
technology sector. But, as suggested earlier, a state is likely to take this step only if the federal
program is insufficient to stimulate green technology. In that case, state stringency is
desirable, even if the state receives some incidental economic benefits from that action.
In theory, a state could adopt a more stringent GHG program in order to achieve additional
environment al co-benefit s . See s upr a note 74 and accompanying text (discussing
environmental co-benefits that could prompt states to set more stringent GHG reduction
goals). But a state whose primary interest is in achieving co-pollutant co-benefits would
be more likely to address co-pollutant regulation directly than to adopt a more stringent
GHG program solely for that purpose.
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up for a federal lapse, they are providing an external benefit that
counterbalances the external costs.
b. External Impacts on Out-of-State Consumers
Although one state’s more stringent requirements on stationary
sources could result in increases in the price of energy or goods for outof-state consumers, that potential impact is a long-accepted consequence
of allowing states to control in-state sources.153 In addition, as noted
above, the national benefit of state stringency could compensate for its
external costs.
As with impacts on the national allowance market, the risk of more
generalized external impacts leading to overregulation is less compelling
for state efforts to achieve more stringent climate-change goals. That
risk is dampened by the likelihood that most forms of state stringency
would impose their primary consequences within the state. Where a state
imposes cost-increasing requirements on its own facilities, it will be
accountable to both its manufacturing sector and its consumers.154 The
risk of over-regulation is thus mitigated by internal political and
economic pressures.
The fear of leakage is also likely to prevent states from overregulating. If a state imposes significantly higher standards on its
electricity or manufacturing sectors and serves a significant out-of-state
population, then it risks losing its out-of-state customers to other
electricity sources or manufacturers and shifting, rather than reducing,
its emissions.
c. Uniformity
Uniformity is a legitimate, but not determinative, concern.155 The
nation’s existing pollution control statutes have long allowed states to
impose more stringent goals or facility standards, notwithstanding the
risk of non-uniformity such state autonomy creates.156 For example, in
153. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 294.
154. State efforts to achieve stringency are thus less likely to result in potential
over-regulation than state product standards that control products produced out-of-state.
155. See Kaswan, supra note 12, at 802 (stating that “[c]onsistency is an important,
but not necessarily determinative, factor” in determining the balance between federal and
state power).
156. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 293-94; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at
616, 635. As Professors Glicksman and Levy note, “[C]oncerns for uniformity cannot be
characterized as particularly central to the purposes of the CAA’s regulation of stationary
sources.” Id. at 636. Professor Andreen notes that Congress has valued uniformity more
in the context of product standards than stationary-source standards. Andreen, supra
note 9, at 293.
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the air pollution context, states retain the power to impose more stringent
air pollution controls on stationary sources,157 and, under Title V of the
Clean Air Act, the states, not the federal government, generally negotiate
specific permitting requirements pursuant to federal requirements and
any more stringent state requirements.158 The Clean Air Act itself
establishes differentiated facility standards based on a region’s
attainment status.159 From an administrative standpoint, facilities are
accustomed to determining additional state requirements.160
Moreover, market-based mechanisms for achieving stringency would
impose even less of an administrative burden on industry than differing
regulatory standards. In a market-based program, the facility must
simply determine how many allowances to submit to the state. It retains
discretion to determine how to comply with the requirement. While the
impacted facilities may seek to avoid the financial costs associated with
more stringent regulation, the existence of differing allowance
requirements does not appear to be an overriding administrative obstacle
to industry.
For industry, the competitive rather than the administrative impacts of
a lack of uniformity are likely to be the more significant concern.
Ultimately, however, the states imposing more stringent reduction
requirements are responsible for weighing the tradeoffs between
achieving their environmental goals and adversely impacting certain instate industries. That in-state industries may prefer to avoid the impact
does not render the state’s democratic choice illegitimate.
The leakage risk presented by non-uniform standards is an important
issue for states to consider in determining whether their efforts to
achieve stringency will be worth it. But the risk of leakage is not a
reason to prevent states from being more stringent. To the extent that
states fear leakage—fear that the competitive impacts of regulating instate sources more stringently will drive industry or production and the
associated emissions elsewhere—the states are unlikely to impose more
stringent limits on stationary sources. While leakage concerns may

157. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006).
158. See Id. §§ 7661-7661f.
159. See supra note 61 (describing different technology-based standards in attainment
and nonattainment areas).
160. See ANDREEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 1, 16 (observing that “[m]ost industries . . .
have s y stems in place to ens ure their compliance w ith different legal regimes at
t he international, federal, state, and local levels”).
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result in relatively few states exercising their autonomy to set more
stringent targets, they do not justify prohibiting states from exercising
autonomy where they believe their requirements could be effective.
Some may argue that the consequences of a lack of uniformity are
acceptable in the context of traditional pollutants because those
pollutants have local impacts and states have a particularly strong
interest in being able to control them further if national emission
requirements are insufficient. In other words, the lack of uniformity is
justified by the importance of state control over local air and water
quality, an issue not raised by GHG gases. As discussed above,
however, powerful arguments for state control over stringency continue
to justify a potential lack of uniformity even in the absence of direct
local impacts. The nation will benefit from a state safety net in the face
of potential federal failure. Moreover, states that choose to integrate
their GHG and co-pollutant reduction strategies could seek to impose
more stringent requirements on stationary sources in order to maximize
local, not simply global, benefits. More broadly, state control over instate facilities remains an important state prerogative, a prerogative that
would be compromised if states were not permitted to establish more
stringent targets and impose them on in-state stationary facilities.
d. Administrative Efficiency
As discussed above, duplicative federal and state roles create certain
governmental inefficiencies. Allowing state control over GHGs would
not, however, create a brand-new state administrative structure. The
Clean Air Act already gives states considerable control over traditional
pollutants and most facilities receive state-issued permits.161 Duplicative
federal and state structures already exist. Allowing state control would
add GHGs to the list of state-controlled pollutants, not create a new role
for states.
In addition, the extent of duplication could be reduced if the federal
government delegated certain compliance and enforcement functions to
the states. While the federal government is likely to maintain control
over federal compliance submissions, certain inspection, monitoring, and
enforcement functions could be delegated to states that have met federal
standards. That would avoid duplicated state and federal action in these
areas. In fact, given limited federal resources and the tradition of state

161. See supra notes 157 to 159 and accompanying text (discussing state controls
under the CAA).
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monitoring and enforcement of facility emissions, the federal government is
likely to seek state assistance.162
While allowing states to set more stringent targets and impose additional
requirements on in-state facilities could create some duplication and
require a greater use of collective government resources than would
occur under a purely federal program, the impact should not be
overstated in light of existing state administrative structures, and must be
considered in light of the political and environmental justifications for
allowing state control.163
e. Conclusion
Most policy choices have trade-offs, and allowing states to set more
stringent targets and retire the associated allowances is no exception.
For most (if not all) of the mechanisms for achieving state stringency
described above, the justifications for allowing state stringency outweigh
their adverse consequences. Ultimately, the entire nation would benefit
from overlapping jurisdiction’s inherent advantages—the greater resilience
that it offers to federal political failure, to changing circumstances,164
and as an antidote to regulatory stagnation.165 Moreover, a state’s capacity
to control in-state facility GHG emissions is an important attribute of
state power.
The most significant concern raised by allowing states to seek more
stringent targets is the potential impact on the national allowance
market. On that score, a state’s use of regulatory mechanisms to achieve
stringency, combined with allowance retirement, is fully acceptable
since there will be little impact on the national allowance market. I
argue that the benefits of allowing state stringency and of giving states
flexibility in their mechanisms for achieving stringency justify letting
162. John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption:
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP . PROBS. 203, 220 (1997). A
full analysis of the role of the states in monitoring, compliance, and enforcement is an
area ripe for inquiry but beyond the scope of this Article.
163. Glicksman and Levy state that “the question . . . is” whether the regulatory burdens
imposed by duplicative federal and state programs justify preempting a state’s ability to
be more protective, and “something more than . . . general concerns for regulatory burdens
should be necessary to warrant ceiling preemption . . .”. Glicksman & Levy, supra note
9, at 607.
164. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Adelman and Engel
arguments).
165. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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states use market mechanisms, such as requiring more allowances per
ton of emissions, notwithstanding some impact on the national allowance
market. The mechanisms that would impose the consequences of the
state’s cap on all states without concentrating the impact in the more
stringent state—those that retire allowances from the national pool prior
to auction and in the absence of regulation—present a more significant
cause for concern. While that impact should be a relevant factor in
considering the relative desirability of such mechanisms, the associated
benefits suggest that this approach should not be ruled out entirely. The
other negative attributes of allowing state stringency, including external
costs resulting from increasing regulation in the more stringent state, a
lack of uniformity, and the administrative costs of overlapping federal
and state control, present the same concerns as existing environmental
statutes, and remain acceptable costs of allowing state autonomy.
A cooperative federalist model that recognizes the importance of both
federal and state roles is as appropriate for GHG policy as it is in the
context of traditional environmental regulation. While the negative
attributes of state control are not irrelevant and their relative impacts are
important considerations in policy design, the negative attributes do not
warrant precluding state stringency.
VI. IM PLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The analysis presented here suggests not only that allowing states to
be more stringent is justified in the abstract but also that there are a
number of acceptable mechanisms by which stringency could be
effectively achieved. The Article presents the primary federalism
implications of each mechanism. Ultimately, however, policymakers
must consider several additional factors in determining what mechanisms to
permit within federal legislation. One important factor in the political
debate will be the relative burden on industry.166 Another factor will be
the relative impact on auction revenue.167 The relative administrative
ease of the alternative mechanisms, whether regulatory or market-based,
is also a relevant consideration. These issues are, however, beyond the
scope of this Article.
166. For example, some mechanisms, like requiring facilities to submit more than one
allowance per ton of emissions, impose the cost of retiring allowances on high-cost reducers
who prefer to purchase allowances rather than reduce emissions. Other mechanisms, like
retiring allowances from the pool prior to distribution, would likely have less financial
impact on covered facilities.
167. Retiring allowances prior to auction is likely to reduce revenue, whereas requiring
industry to submit additional allowances per ton of emissions would not. Auction revenue is
likely to be critical to implementing many important climate-related policies, like investments
in energy efficiency and alternative technology, adaptation, and international climate assistance.
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As policymakers consider how to design federal legislation to allow
state stringency, they are likely to consider the issue in the larger
context: to what extent should a federal cap-and-trade program devolve
power to the states? That is why this Article situates potential mechanisms
for achieving state stringency within three possible options for decentralized
power: the light, medium, and heavy decentralization models. The
choice of model does not impact whether state stringency could be
achieved; it could be achieved under all of these models. The choice of
model does, however, have a significant impact on a state’s options for
retiring allowances.
Under the light decentralization model reflected in existing environmental
statutes, states could set more stringent general goals and annual caps.
States could also impose regulatory requirements on in-state sources to
reduce emissions below the reductions that would have been expected
under a trading system. However, whether they regulate directly or not,
the states would have to rely upon the federal government to either retire
the extra allowances or give them allowances that they could then
retire.168 The light decentralization model limits a state’s options for
achieving stringency and retiring allowances. Moreover, if the federal
government auctions allowances and the state does not choose to meet
its more stringent target through regulation, then the only available
mechanism for retiring allowances—having the federal government or
the state withhold them from the national allowance supply—has the
relatively undesirable impact of imposing the impact on the national
allowance market as a whole rather than concentrating it within the more
stringent state. Thus, if federal legislation calls for allowances to be
auctioned, the medium or heavy decentralization models could present
preferable options for retiring allowances.
Under the medium decentralization model, in which states could
require in-state facilities to submit federal allowances in an in-state
compliance process, states could more directly control the allowance
retirement options. They could set regulatory standards and then, if the
168. As suggested above, if the federal government distributes allowances for free,
it could distribute fewer allowances to facilities in the more stringent state. If the federal
government auctioned allowances and the more stringent state achieved its stringency
through regulation, the federal government could hold back the associated reductions
from the national allowance pool. However, if a state does not achieve its stringency
through regulatory mechanisms and the federal government auctions allowances, then the
s t at es ’ goals w ould have t o be met by t he federal government w it hholding
allow ances from the national pool prior to auction.
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federal government freely distributes allowances, require facilities to
submit their extra allowances to the state. Or, instead of achieving
stringency through regulatory standards, they could simply require instate facilities to submit more federal allowances per ton of emissions, a
mechanism that would simultaneously achieve greater stringency by
requiring more emissions per allowance and retire the extra allowances.
The medium decentralization model clearly offers the states more
options than the light decentralization model.
State stringency would be easiest to achieve under the heavy
decentralization model. Prior to distributing allowances to in-state
facilities, states could retire the extra reductions from the emissions
budget received from the federal government.
Ultimately, federal policymakers will not adopt one or another
decentralization model based solely upon its implications for state
stringency. While the options each model presents for achieving
stringency are relevant factors in the relative desirability of each model,
many other factors will influence policymakers’ choice of model. The
medium decentralization model, which allows states to establish their
own compliance process, could provide states with a range of powers
over GHG trading.169 The heavy decentralization model presents a much
greater devolution of power to the states by allowing them to make the
critical political and economic decisions about how to allocate
allowances to in-state facilities in the first place. The choice of model
therefore presents issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
Although I do not advocate for the adoption of a particular
decentralization model in this Article, I note that, if federal legislation is
designed to allow states to be more stringent, the scope of state and
federal authorities must be explicit. As Professor Buzbee argues in this
Symposium volume, entities resisting state control are likely to
challenge state efforts as preempted, and, unless the federal legislation
unambiguously allows the type of state control in question, the courts
could find that the federal legislation impliedly preempts state controls.170
More specifically, if federal legislation follows a light decentralization
model, federal legislation would have to create a mechanism for either
169. I address some of these powers, including controls on offset use and trading
controls to maximize co-pollutant reduction benefits, in Kaswan, supra note 10.
170. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part VI; Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative
to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 787-92 (2006) (describing courts’ tendencies to find implicit
preemption); Robert K. Huffman & Jonathon M . Weisgall, Climate Change and the
States : Constitutional Iss ues Ar ising from State Climate Protection L eadership,
8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL ’Y 6, 9 (2008) (stating that courts would likely hold that
federal climate legislation occupies the field of GHG regulation and therefore preempts
state programs).
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the federal government to retire associated allowances or the allowances
to be given to the states to retire, instead of auction. To enable a
medium form of decentralization, federal legislation would have to
explicitly authorize state-imposed restrictions on the use of federal
allowances or offsets, or the state programs would risk preemption or
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges. 171 To create the heavy
decentralization model, explicit provisions would have to authorize the
federal government to set state allowance budgets for participating states
and create a mechanism for delegating allowance distribution responsibilities
to the states.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the breadth of cap-and-trade programs currently being
considered, the states’ role in environmental regulation will be
substantially diminished if they are preempted from setting caps and
realizing greater stringency through controls on stationary-source
emissions. Ironically, preserving state power does not undermine
national well-being; it protects the nation as a whole from the risk of
federal failure. With careful attention to detail, Congress can design
mechanisms that capitalize on the benefits of state action while
minimizing its drawbacks. Our system of federalism and the values of
state control and autonomy that it embodies suggest that Congress
should create effective mechanisms for the exercise of state power.

171. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part III(C) (discussing preemption risk); Farber,
supra note 15, at 915, 918-19 (arguing that, unless explicitly authorized by Congress,
state restrictions on federal allowance use by covered facilities will likely be preempted);
NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND
LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 13. For example, when New York State imposed restrictions
on in-state facilities’ ability to sell acid rain allowances to facilities in upwind states, the
2nd Circuit concluded that such restrictions were contrary to, and hence preempted by
the Clean Air Act. Clean Air M kts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003). The
district court also found that the restrictions violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Clean Air M kts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). A requirement
that facilities submit “extra” allowances to the state would have the same effect as a
prohibition on selling them, and could face a similar constitutional challenge. See Glicksman
& Levy, supra note 9, at 646.
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